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This dissertation aims to study the relationship between the economic dimension of “new wars” 
and the perpetuation of violence. The analysis on the economic dimension of “new wars” shows 
that it is an essential aspect to understand in an interconnected and globalized setting because 
there are impacts on the state-building and on the social and political spheres.   
The main question of the thesis is going to analyze the main aspects of the war economy in 
Kosovo. One of the hypotheses holds that in contemporary wars, the state suffers increased 
levels of violence, which leads to a non-ending cycle of internal crisis, because of the economic 
aspect of war. The goal is to explore this hypothesis and to analyze the nature and characteristics 
of the war economy as well as, to understand how the perpetuation of violence can easily spread 
on a transnational level. One of the main sources for the discussion of the “new wars” theory 
are the book New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 2012 by Mary Kaldor and 
the book The New Wars, 2003 by Herfried Münkler. Kaldor has an extensive fieldwork 
experience on the type of intrastate conflicts and analyses the main aspects of conflicts in 
different parts of the world.  
 While Kaldor and Münkler focus on the “new wars” thesis, authors such as Philippe Le Billon 
in the paper The Political Economy of War: What Relief Agencies Need to Know, 2000 provides 
a better insight into the different types of war, their characteristics and challenges. Finally, 
authors such as Francesco Stratazzi in the article with the tittle Between ethnic collision and 
mafia collusion, 2006 and Jenny H. Peterson, in the article with the title Transforming a war 
economy, 2014 provide an even more detailed analysis of the economic aspects of the conflict 
in the Balkan region and in relation to the case on Kosovo’s war economy. 
 The dissertation is divided into three chapters. The first chapter examines the nature of the 
“new wars” based on a qualitative research of the central authors on the topic. The second 
chapter analyses the political economy of weak states and the causes for the perpetuation of 
violence. In the third chapter, the case study on the Kosovo war economy is discussed and 
analyzed to better understand the theoretical aspects of the economy of the war in the case of 
Kosovo. The main goal of our thesis is to study the related causes of the economic dimension 
of these types of war and to understand how the awareness of war economy can help to take 
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Peace cannot be achieved through violence; it can 
only be attained through understanding.  
― Ralph Waldo Emerson1 
 
Since the beginning of human history, war is considered as the driving force in the 
transformation of societies. By learning from the wars of the past, we hope to prevent war in 
the future. For this, we consider looking at the factors that shape contemporary wars of the end 
of the twentieth century. Studies on the contemporary wars focus on the changing patterns of 
conflicts. That is, the  nature of warfare has changed since the end of the Cold War period, 
which represented the formation of new nation-states, rapid developments of technology and 
communication, free movement of people and free-market and global economy. With these 
new developments leading to a freer and more open world,  the emergence of new identities 
and challenges started to affect the newly formed identities because of statehood failure. The 
economic dimension an especially important factor in the studying why, in the long run, low-
intensity violence has become more and more recurrent, and conflict tends to persist. 
I. Context and Research Question 
The emergent new challenges have not only transformed warfare but also shaped the events in 
the current geopolitical context. The transformation began to be most apparent by the post-
Cold War period that left behind a vacuum of power along the peripheries of the two major 
superpowers. The challenges that characterize the contemporary geopolitical context are 
addressed in the 1992 document by the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and provides 
with recommendations to the United Nations on how to approach contemporary conflicts. 
These involve preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping (Boutros-Ghali: 1992). 
 




However, these solutions were hard to always put into practice as the shaping patterns of 
intrastate conflicts have offered additional reasons for conflict perpetuation. One of such 
shaping patterns can be attributed to the emergence of warlord entrepreneurs and a range of 
different warrying groups that are interested in the business of war. Because of the emergence 
of new, non-state actors, state power suffers erosion, which consequently generates economic, 
political and social unrest. In addition, a weak state usually means that the economy has 
developed and consolidated a shadow economy, which in turn is the opposite of formal 
economy. Shadow economy can affect an entire region and develop very fast through the 
engagement of warring groups in criminal networks, who trade illicit goods and services in and 
out of the country and pass them into other countries in the region. For the shadow economy 
to function, shadow institutions are also created, which can only be taken down by 
strengthening the institutions existing from a formal economy based on the premises of a rule-
of-law oriented state.  
Within this context, our main thesis question is the following: are the economic factors the 
most relevant to understand the persistence and ongoing nature of the new wars? The 
hypothesis holds that the economic factor is essential in understanding the persistence of war 
economies in intrastate conflicts and provides better understanding to the challenges in these 
conflicts. In order to analyze this question, Kosovo’s case is a good example to understand the 
enduring consequences of the new wars. It is a case study which shares many of such new wars 
characteristics, and a long-term development of the shadow economy. This is the reason this 
thesis is focused on that conflict that marked world politics in the 90s and affected the whole 
region until today.  
The war of Kosovo-Serbia is one of the many wars that portrays the specificities of the new 
wars political, economic, military, and war struggles. In Kosovo's case, the shadow economy 
3 
 
has developed well before the Yugoslavian dissolution and have played an essential role in the 
armed struggle with the Republic of Serbia. For instance, the networks emergent from the 
shadow economy, including remittances and support from the diaspora, have contributed to a 
substantial economic and political support for war entrepreneurs. The armed struggle in 
Kosovo began with the primary objective to earn an independent status for Kosovo and to 
reestablish Albanian Kosovans rights. However, Albanian Kosovars faced Serbs resistance. 
The emergence of shadow economy can be said to constitute a need which helped assert the 
position of the newly formed identities within Yugoslavian Federation, while facing a major 
economic crisis which broke into violent conflict and later, into a bloody war. For instance, 
some of characteristics associated to economic factor are most people living in extreme 
poverty, high unemployment, and overall economic underdevelopment. 
Authors also encounter the patterns of conflict associated with the development of shadow 
economies, the so called “grey”, “black”, and “mafia-type” economy with well-developed 
criminal networks. Some non-state actors emerged as a waring group which initially fought for 
Kosovo's cause. However, the Kosovo Liberation Army is also a group associated with criminal 
activity, whose activity allegedly continues to affect the economy in development in Kosovo. 
Furthermore, by provoking the Serbian side, violence exacerbated on both sides accompanied 
by violent massacres. The continuation of the struggle eventually led to the Kosovo War in 
1998-1999. 
When analyzing Kosovo's case, not only should the ancient ethnic divisions be considered, but 
also the development of a shadow economy pre-existent to the dissolution of the Yugoslavian 
Federation. Since economic factors do play a significant role in the context of the new war and 
the state erosion, it is then essential to study and analyze one of such conflicts such as the 
Kosovo case study to understand which economic aspects generate ongoing conflicts in 




The analysis of the shadow economy will not only explain the causes leading to the Kosovo 
War but also give an insight into the current crisis and the state of the economic situation in 
Kosovo. This case study encouraged an interest because Kosovo has a wide amount of research 
on the shadow economy, for it having been existent not only in Kosovo but also within the 
whole Balkan region. Also, it is a conflict situated within Europe, which at the time created a 
divide in the international organizations. Furthermore, development of criminal networks and 
provocations by Kosovo and Serbia have also led to one of the most significant humanitarian 
interventions by NATO in 1999.  By discussing the topic of the new wars, we can better 
understand the causes, repercussion, and challenges of the contemporary conflicts, and how the 
effects of informal economies can be mitigated to lead to better economic development and 
help build a more robust state. Lastly, because I have origins in Eastern Europe in it of my 
interest to analyze the countries which experienced the consequences of statehood failure, 
strong political crisis, as well as, problems associated to illicit economy, all of which have in 
general affected the countries in the Eastern Europe. 
III. Methodology & case study 
The dissertation is based on the qualitative analysis based on theoretical arguments from 
various authors on the topics of new wars, the war economy, and Kosovo's case study. The 
book The New Wars, by Herfried Münkler (2005) is the primary basis for the topic in analysis, 
as well as other texts such as Wars of the 21rst Century. Another essential author is Mary 
Kaldor and Mark Duffield, who offer a complement to Münkler theory on new wars. However, 
Münkler remains the primary source because of his focus on the relation between new wars 
and the war economy. Additionally, the study on the shadow economy is based mainly on 
authors such as Philippe Le Billon, Dietrich Jung (2003) and conference reports and articles on 
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the war economy. The report by Marcatan Humphreys titled as Economics and Violent Conflict 
2003, discusses the causes of the development of war economies.2 Besides the conference titled 
as War Economies in a Regional Context 2004,3 by Kaysie Studdard, discusses the main 
regional challenges and approaches to solving the war economy in countries over different 
continents. Lastly, for the case study, some of the primary references are Peterson (2014)4 and 
Sorensen (2006)5, who provide arguments on the effects of the shadow economy in the Balkan 
region.  
IV. State of the art 
Considering the thesis authors such as Mary Kaldor and Herfried Münkler helped us to better 
understand the contemporary conflicts and the future challenges of problems which arise from 
the study of the thesis question. 
The pressing issue that arises from these conflicts is that even after the wars, violence is likely 
to continue because there are economic factors associated with the transformation of the new 
wars. They can be characterized as a war of greed, increased corruption, violence against 
civilians, driven by the advantages that some actors can profit from the continuation of the war. 
Weakened nation-states are characterized as states who have suffered erosion, have lost the 
control over most of the areas of state responsibility such as the monopoly of violence, basic 
institutions, Parliament and the Judiciary, but also the education and health sector. 
Consequently, chaos is present in the social, political, and economic dimensions. The state is 
 
2 HUMPHREYS, Marcatan (2003). “Economics and Violent Conflict.” Harvard University. 
Retrieved:https://www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/files/Economics_and_Violent_Conflict.pdfven (retrieved in 
2/5/2019). 
3  STUDDARD, Kaysie. “War Economies in a Regional Context: Overcoming the Challenges of Transformation.” 
International Peace Academy. 2004, March. Available at: https://www.ipinst.org/wp-
content/uploads/publications/wareconomies.pdf (acessed 8/3/2019).  
4
 PETERSON, Jenny, H. “Transforming a war economy: learning from the case of Kosovo”. In Peterson, Jenny, 
H. “Building a peace economy? Liberal peacebuilding and the development-security industry” Manchester 
University Press, 2014: 69-84.  
5 SÖRENSEN, Jens, S. “The Shadow Economy, War, and State Building: Social Transformation and Re-
stratification in an Illiberal Economy (Serbia and Kosovo)”. In: Journal of Contemporary European Studies, nº 
14(3), 2006: 317-351. 
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no longer capable of maintaining order and provide security as a legitimate entity of national 
security. Instead, a range of diverse non-state actors emerged and gained control over power 
and authority over the failed state. Such non-state actors are usually formed by irregular armed 
forces, such as guerrillas, terrorists, bandits, and robbers, who are capable of developing 
networks with mafia groups, organized crime networks, and private security companies to 
obtain the necessary funding and training in these types of conflicts. For a weakened nation-
state, the emergence of the non-state actor is a problematical factor because they can extend 
the duration of conflicts, even making them challenging to end. 
Mary Kaldor6 who was one of the strongest influences for this work, argues that warfare has 
changed in the past years, which is evidenced in the increasing number of intrastate wars and 
the decreasing number of interstate wars. That is, wars have mainly been fought within the 
nation-states rather than between nation-states. A peak in the intrastate wars has been registered 
during the 1990s, a period of several newly forming nation-states. Conflicts might appear to be 
domestic, internal, and exclusive of a nation-state. However, in the contemporary setting, 
conflicts can be said to have gained a new force because they can spread more quickly and are 
more challenging to control. Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe are the continents that 
have faced most of the contemporary type of wars, termed by authors as the new wars of the 
end of the twentieth century.  
The discussion on new wars is based both on theory and empirical evidence. Herfried Münkler 
(2005) is one of the primary references who wrote on the theory of new wars and focuses on 
the economy of war in his book called The New Wars, 2003, Münkler7 argues that after the 
1990s, the amount of the intrastate wars has been increasing and the interstate wars have been 
decreasing. According to Richard Jackson (2007), in his article Towards an Understanding of 
 
6 KALDOR, Mary. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 3rd Edition, Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2012. 
7 MÜNKLER, Hertfried. The New Wars, Oxford: Polity Press, 2005. 
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Contemporary Intrastate War, intrastate war accounts for "more than 90 percent of all 
international conflicts since the early 1990s" (Jackson, 2007: 212). Also, according to Kaldor, 
wars nowadays are characterized by a "minimum number of battle deaths" (Kaldor, 2012: vii). 
Additionally, to emphasize the distinction between intrastate and the interstate wars, Kaldor 
finds that actors, aims, methods, and goals are different from the logic of the old wars, which 
is a theoretical framework based on the works of Clausewitz. Therefore, the current geopolitical 
context is characterized by a new logic of warfare, termed as the new wars. The new wars are 
an intrastate type of war, which can be distinguished from the ‘old wars,' or wars between 
nation-state. Mary Kaldor argues that ‘new wars' are different from the past classical wars, and 
for this purpose, Kaldor explains this distinction by analyzing the type actors involved, goals, 
aims, and methods. In the new wars, actors are associated mainly to the emergence of several 
non-state actors, but also, to different goals, methods, and finance. Non-state actors became 
part of a complex mix of interests of actors who partake in the conflict. 
At the same time, critics, such as Kalyvas (2001), Newman (2004) and Singer (2002) argue 
that new wars are not new. For them, the nature of conflict has not changed, which means 
violent conflict is the same as in the past. For instance, new wars share many similar 
characteristics with the wars of the pre-modern state period, such as the Thirty-Year War 
period. In response to the critics of the new wars, Mary Kaldor considers that new wars are 
new because critics overlook some essential distinctions between concepts such as identity 
politics and ideology and hybrid warfare and mixed warfare (Kaldor, 2012: 5). Furthermore, 
Kaldor argues that globalization is a crucial element in the dynamics of new wars. There are 
dangers associated with globalization, such as conflicts spreading across borders. The spread 
of conflicts is associated dramatically to the complexity of actors. For instance, Münkler argues 
that state power has fragmented among distinct actors. These actors are termed by Münkler as 
"war entrepreneurs" to describe a range of new wars actors whose primary motivation is greed. 
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These war entrepreneurs take advantages in the disintegration of the state and the breakdown 
of existing democratic institutions. These circumstances create an opportunity for the warlords 
to start profiting in economic ways and further allowing them to hurt the state capacity. 
Therefore, over time, these wars tend to spread, persist, and recur for decades.   
One of the leading causes in the new wars is the long existent ancient hatreds that lead to ethnic 
conflicts. However, authors such as Jenny Sorensen in the journal titled as The Shadow 
Economy, War and State Building, 2006,8 as well as the analysis in the article titled as The 
Economics of War: the intersection of need, creed and greed, 2001, by Jake Sherman9, both 
consider that there is not enough focus on the economic aspect of the conflict. In this sense, 
these studies explain that the issue affecting the economic aspect of new wars is the 
development of the shadow economy. That is, the shadow economy contributes to state erosion 
because parallel institutions replace state institutions. Overall, state erosion is associated with 
issues such as corruption of political and legal authority, weak economic development, and 
political unrest. 
Therefore, as Münkler (2005) argues, war entrepreneurs, become an enterprise which is led 
majorly for economic reasons, other than for political or ideological reasons. Besides, 
according to Kaldor (2012), the “new wars are a war rather violent enterprise framed in political 
terms” (Kaldor, 2013: 6). That is, politics is an instrument used by war entrepreneurs for 
economic reasons. According to Kaldor (2013) is that new wars are about disintegration 
because war entrepreneurs use violence to maintain power over the territory and civilians for 
their benefit.   
 
8 SÖRENSEN, Jens, S. “The Shadow Economy, War, and State Building: Social Transformation and Re-
stratification in an Illiberal Economy (Serbia and Kosovo)”. In: Journal of Contemporary European Studies, nº 
14(3), 2006: 317-351. 
9 SHERMAN, Jake. “The Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Greed, and Greed. Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars.” In: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Washington, D.C. 
September 10, 2001. 
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In the book, Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts, and New Wars, 2003, Dietrich Jung,10 
argues that the age of globalization marks the gradual erosion of state authority. In addition to 
the state erosion, the phenomenon of “globalization has been accompanied in the emergence 
of violent war economies rather than pacified market structures” in the developing countries 
(Jung, 2003: 2). Furthermore, Jung argues that the financial assets of the war economy enter 
the liberal market, which is a consequence of a blur between the formal and the shadow 
economy. This blur makes it challenging to detect a war economy’s financial structure (Jung, 
2013: 3). Additionally, Kaldor argues that globalization is also responsible for the creation of 
the blur between state and non-state, public and private, external and internal, economic and 
political, war and peace; For example, there is a blur between legitimate armed forces and 
paramilitary groups. In their place, privatized agencies hire mercenaries to fight in the conflict. 
Some examples are Zaire, Angola, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, and 
former Yugoslavian Federation (Adams, 1999: 103).11 
The transition to democracy is a challenge to modern democracies, politically socially, and 
economically. For instance, the implementation of privatization without a healthy state 
institution allows criminal groups and warlords easy access to the liberal market. According to 
Jung (2003) “the dynamics of commerce, the impact of aid, and the structures of capitalism 
can just as easily feed mafias, warlords and civil wars“ (Jung, 2003: ix). Therefore, 
globalization, privatization, and fragmentation of state power have led to the emergence of a 
range of war entrepreneurs who develop into regional and later into global networks. It is 
considered that by cutting the chains of trade of the criminal networks, then failed states will 
 
10 JUNG, Dietrich. (2006). Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts, and New Wars: A Political Economy of Intra-
state war, London, Routledge, 2006: 1-6 
11 ADAMS, Thomas, K. “The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict.” in: Army of War College 
Quarterly. vol. 24, no.2 (Summer 1999): 103-16.  
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be able to recover from the vices of a war economy. However, to bring these networks to an 
end is a commonly difficult task in failed states.  
All of these author’s studies claim that the main challenges with stopping the armed conflict in 
“new wars” is that warring parties rely on the advantages of state disintegration. It seems that 
stopping the conflict is not a good enough incentive, especially for non-state actors. Instead, 
they benefit from the continuation of violence, and so their methods will usually translate in 
the use of violent political, economic, and social projects. This is where the ethnic conflict 
comes as a central topic in the discussion of the “new wars”.  It is a method of violence which 
is intentionally directed at innocent civilians of other ethnicities within a territory. A weak state 
cannot provide security and good institutions and representation for all the population and 
especially the minorities living within an ethnically diverse society. Conflicts tend to break out 
even more often in a nation-state in which chaos predominates.  In the “new wars”, players 
take advantage of the vulnerable situation within the territory where a state is unable to execute 
its essential functions. The political violence is mobilized deliberately by groups interested in 
maintaining power, mainly for economic benefits. They become an enterprise which is led 
majorly for economic reasons, other than for political or ideological reasons. Therefore, “new 
wars” are about disintegration, and they continue to weaken the states. For the warlords and 
criminal groups, violence has become the instrument with which they can maintain flows of 
revenue.  
When discussing the intrastate wars, authors tend to emphasize the ethnic conflict as the leading 
cause of contemporary conflicts. However, others find essential the study of the dynamic of 
the economy of war, especially when conflicts tend to spread across borders. Therefore, 
policymakers must consider looking at conflicts from a new approach to mitigate the effects of 
the shadow economy. 
11 
 
V. Structure of the thesis  
In order to answer the question whether war economy is the most relevant feature of new wars, 
I decided to divide the thesis in three parts, namely the characterization of the “new wars” 
theory in chapter I, the analysis of the war economy in chapter II and finally the case study on 
Kosovo’s war economy in chapter III.  
To sum up, the quote by Emerson is a relevant quote because violence is never the solution to 
solving problems. Instead, violence can negatively affect societies and human relations at large, 
on an individual as well as on a global level, where besides ethnic causes, the economic causes 
can be detrimental for peacebuilding in most frail states. 
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Chapter I: The “New Wars” Theory: characterization, critique and defense 
“Never, never, never believe any war will be 
smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on 
the strange voyage can measure the tides and 
hurricanes he will encounter. The statesman who 
yields to war fever must realize that once the 
signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy 
but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable 
events.”  
― Winston Churchill12 
 
In different periods of world history, war has always had the power to shape and significantly 
affect the course of human affairs. The term opposite to war and violent conflict is Peace. The 
concept of peace is defined simply by the absence of war and a desire for harmony. According 
to the Handbook of Peace and Conflict, peace can be defined “both as means of personal and 
collective ethical transformation and an aspiration to cleanse the planet of human-inflicted 
destruction.” (Galtung, J. & Webel, C., 2007: 7). However, everlasting peace is difficult to put 
into practice as new challenges arise in a continuously changing geopolitical context. As the 
quest for peace continues, new approaches for solving war must be adopted against the 
emergent new threats. These new threats indicate that war has indeed suffered a transformation 
and pose new challenges for peacekeeping, which seem to encourage violence, poverty, as well 
as local, regional, and global insecurity13. In order to understand the contemporary conflicts, 
policymakers must consider approaches to contemporary wars different from the ones based 
on the logic of past warfare. Therefore, if an old theoretical framework will continue to be a 
guide for policymakers on regulating contemporary wars, subsequently efforts to contain 
violence will be inadequate and ineffective. 
 
12 Jones, B. A. (2019, April 15). Winston Churchill Gave One of the Most Poignant Quotes Ever About Warfare. 
Retrieved from https://taskandpurpose.com/winston-churchill-gave-one-of-the-most-poignant-quotes-ever-
about-warfare 
13. Efforts to understand the new challenges of the current geopolitical context have been expressed in the 1992 
document by the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The document provides with recommendations to the 
United Nations on how to approach contemporary conflicts, through preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and 
peacekeeping (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). 
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1.1.The decline of intrastate war and the increase in interstate war 
The emergent new challenges have not only transformed warfare but also shaped the events in 
the current geopolitical context. The transformation began to be most apparent by the post-
Cold War period that left behind a vacuum of power along the peripheries of the two major 
superpowers. Additionally, with the emergence of globalization, not only the state power began 
to suffer fragmentation and erosion but also, constitutes new challenges and repercussions for 
the international order. Meanwhile, International Organizations have been increasingly 
devoted to solving conflicts among different nations. However, war has continuously proved 
to be a significant concern because of a rise in inequality, poverty, high inflows of refugees, 
and armed conflicts for ethnic reasons within a territory.  All these issues create a sense of 
insecurity, which is present in regions such as across Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe. The 
insecurity felt in many parts of the world can be attributed to the changes in warfare. While the 
wars of the past were about battles between states, contemporary warfare can be said to have 
gained a new logic. However, even if old wars thesis is now obsolete, the theory provides a 
theoretical background to traditional wars.  
The most referenced philosophy of war is the book On War, written by the Prussian general14, 
Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831). Clausewitz was the most prominent theorist on military and 
classical warfare, and his book On War, written one year following the Napoleonic wars. 
According to the book On Wars, wars were mainly decisive battles between nation-states, the 
state was a centralized power over the administration, economy, and military structures. 
Besides, states were in a period of the state-building process, especially in the seventieth to 
nineteenth centuries to reach consolidation. An essential element of this achievement is the 
ability of the state’s control over the monopoly of violence. Likewise, the war became the 
 
14 Clausewitz who was a professional soldier and took part in military campaigns, drawing his inspiration mainly 
from the Frederick the Great campaign and the Napoleon military campaign.   
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legitimate instrument of state policy. Kaldor (2012) argues that for Clausewitz, the act of 
violence was only legitimate when war was fought between sovereign States. That is, sovereign 
states are entities that act in their national interest, with a clearly defined goal. Additionally, 
for the state as an entity to achieve its political end, it had to compel the enemy to “fulfill the 
will” through waging war against one another, likewise a sovereign State (Kaldor, 2012: 18). 
In this sense, Clausewitz defines war as rational, national, and instrumental, because political 
authority resides in the sovereign state power.  
Furthermore, Clausewitz theory of war analyses main elements that define the nature of 
classical warfare15. Clausewitz definition of real war, which differentiated from the war on 
paper, was the result of the constraints between the political goal and the practical limitations 
of unforeseen circumstances. Clausewitz also distinguishes between the physical and moral 
aspect of war, both required to succeed in war.  For Clausewitz, war, in theory, tends to towards 
extremes, yet war is also a social activity which bonds together “reason, chance and strategy, 
and passion” which in turn are linked respectively “to the state or the political leaders, the army 
or the generals, and level of people”, which are elements that constitute the “trinity of war” 
(Kaldor, 2012: 23).  Moreover, in order to win battles, the commander must master the arts of 
attrition and maneuver. Both theories complement one another16. Attrition means the strategy 
of offense and maneuver is the strategy of defense. However, these aspects of war that 
Clausewitz discusses are mainly part of the types of direct and decisive battles, most 
predominantly among states. Therefore, Clausewitz theory is classified as an intrastate war of 
the modern state consolidation period. However, few are mentioned in respect to the small wars 
 
15. According to the analysis by Gardner (2009), war is an interrelation between the "the inevitability of friction 
and fog, the relationship between military strategy and political objectives and the "paradoxical trinity" (Gardner, 
2009, 120). Friction and fog, for instance, characterizes the aspects of war that can be unpredictable to achieving 
victory for the army, such as problems of logistics, imperfect information, uncertain weather, indiscipline, steep 
terrain (Kaldor, 2012: 24) 
16. While Attrition in battle is meant to achieve victory by wearing down the enemy, the maneuver theory in 
battles is meant to take the enemy by surprise and anticipation.  
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or low-intensity conflicts17, which, for instance, have increasingly gained importance in the 
contemporary type of warfare. Therefore, when characterizing the contemporary wars, one 
must distinguish the type of war most prevalent in the given period.  
According to Richard Jackson (2007), in his article Towards an Understanding of 
Contemporary Intrastate War, intrastate war accounts for "more than 90% of all international 
conflicts since the early 1990s" (Jackson, 2007: 212). Jackson adds that since the year 1945, 
there was an increase in 70 % of the Intra-state wars, and by 1990s there was about 90%; and 
30-40% of conflicts were highly probable to recur at any moment, anywhere in the world 
(Jackson, 2007: 121). Furthermore, according to graphic bellow from the book Theories of 
Violent Conflict, seven out of one hundred and eighteen armed conflicts were interstate 
between 1989 to 2004. (Demmers, 2016: 3).18  Furthermore, the intrastate conflicts can be 
further categorized into the internationalized intrastate armed conflicts, which accounted for 
about seven out of thirty-six registered intrastate conflict between 2004-2009. 
Source: Demmers, 2016: 3 
Besides, Herfried Münkler (2005), in his book called The “new wars”, argues that after the 
1990s, the amount of the intrastate wars has been increasing and the interstate wars have been 
 
17 Instead, the book focuses on the military armed conflict between nation-states in the Imperialist period, in a 
time when there was a frequent ambition for conquest beyond state borders. 
18 In figure 0.1, the 1990s represent the peak of intrastate conflict.  
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decreasing. The intrastate wars are different from the modern state-building period, 
characterized as the interstate wars. The later symmetrical war was waged between states who 
were wholly acting under the state interest. On the other hand, the intrastate wars are an 
asymmetrical type of wars. Münkler states that the one aspect of the symmetrical warfare was 
that there existed limitation in the use of force, and therefore a state would not wage war against 
an unmatched opponent (Münkler, 2003: 20). However, Münkler argues that the intrastate wars 
are the opposite of the wars of the international system19. That is because Münkler defines 
intrastate wars as transnational wars, whose aspects are leading reasons for concern in conflicts 
today and many parts of the world. The strategies such as guerrilla-style conflicts and global 
terrorism are part of these transnational wars, and they are wars which are part of the 
asymmetry strategy because a weak state becomes capable of inflicting damage against a state 
with superior power capabilities. Also, the Geneva Conventions have become obsolete to the 
cases in the contemporary armed conflicts20. Armed conflicts became "wildly unbalanced" 
which make even the most technologically sophisticated powers to be vulnerable to the attacks 
of the irregular combatants, paramilitaries and criminals who "intermingle and terrorize local 
population to achieve their own goal" (Nevers, 2006: 369). The International Intervention 
solution to providing aid in zones of conflict has usually followed the logic of the traditional 
war. In worse cases, Humanitarian Intervention becomes an essential center for sustaining the 
criminal and violent groups in the new war. 
Moreover, overall international intervention in “new wars” is argued to be inefficient and 
ineffective because international intervention and aid comes too late for the failed states and 
 
19. According to Williams (2008), “While interstate disputes (its original justification) will always pose threats to 
international order, intrastate conflicts – often linked into global arms, trade and drug trafficking networks – are 
widespread and constitute substantial threats to regional and even global stability.” (Williams, 2008: 338). 
20. The Geneva Convention did not apply against the war on terror, as their non-state actors are not considered to 
be a "side" that can enter an international agreement that governs wars. That is because the state is a failed state 
it has an insufficient status to be recognized as a legitimate government that can be recognized by the international 
community ( Nevers, 2006: 373) 
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other times there is a lack of necessary resources for peacekeeping. For instance, peace 
enforcement has not always been successful21  
In conclusion, the trend in Interstate armed conflicts has been decreasing both in frequency and 
in intensity. However, the sharp increase in intrastate armed conflicts have increased and have 
impacted civilians, which gives rise to insecurity, both locally and globally. One of the main 
concerns of “new wars” is that there are elements that reinforce and perpetuates the violence, 
making these wars seem endless. Despite the external efforts and attention by the international 
community in these armed conflicts of “new wars”, they tend to persist. The next part will 
characterize the “new wars” and the primary aspiration of the “new wars”, which in fact might 
be driven more for economic motivations rather than the political and ideological aspirations.   
1.2.Characterization of “new wars” 
In the book on New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Mary Kaldor argues 
that the contemporary nature of wars has changed compared with the Clausewitz classical 
warfare. Kaldor's main argument in the thesis of "new wars" is that: 
during the last decades of the twentieth century, a new type of organized 
violence developed, especially in Africa and Eastern Europe, which is one 
aspect of the current globalized era (Kaldor, 2012: 1).  
The type of armed conflict which Kaldor emphasized is the intrastate wars, which are also 
termed as the “new wars”. To emphasize the distinction between intrastate and the interstate 
wars, Kaldor (2013) in the article In Defense of New Wars Stability, argues that actors, aims, 
methods, and goals are different from the logic of old wars. Therefore, the current geopolitical 
context is characterized by a new logic of warfare, termed as the “new wars”.  
 
21. Such failed attempts were according to Lacina and Gleditsch, "the UN deployment to Somalia ended in 
humiliation, as did missions to the Balkans and Rwanda," with some significant humanitarian crises in West 
Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo even being ignored (Lacina and Glenditsch, 2004: 160). 
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According to Kaldor (2013), the actors of the “new wars” involve a network of state and 
particularly, non-state actors, with the goals which are often directed for reasons of identity 
politics. Identity politics is different from ideology and geopolitics. Identity politics is 
associated with globalization and the development of communications technology, as well as 
with increases in migration and the erosion of inclusive ideologies.  
The aims of the actors usually revolve around the access to the state for particular groups who 
might be local or even transnational. However, none of the actors carry a policy which will 
benefit the broader public. A central aim of the actors also becomes the waging of war for the 
construction of identity politics, and therefore, political mobilization becomes focused around 
identity politics. The methods by which “new wars” are to achieve these political goals, rarely 
occur through the battles against one enemy. Instead, actors focus on capturing the territory 
through political means and take control of the population. The methods for controlling the 
population are violent, involving such acts for the forcible removal of a different identity or a 
different opinion. However, violence is also used with interest to continue violence for 
economic motives. Lastly, the forms of finance which are associated to weak states come from 
loot and pillage, diaspora support, humanitarian aid taxation, kidnapping or smuggling in oil, 
diamonds, drugs, and people, in order to finance the political activity. Ultimately the 
consequences of the failed states and regional criminal networks gradually give way to a 
globalized war economy.  
The “new wars” goals, aims, and methods of finance are associated with these issues. 
Therefore, the economic aspect is important to analyze to understand the nature of the “new 
wars”. By taking into consideration the theme of the thesis, it also becomes essential to follow 
Herfried Münkler (2005) book on The New Wars, since he focuses mainly on the topic of the 
financial aspect of “new wars”. First, to understand the financial aspect of the “new wars”, it 
is essential to discuss the main changing patterns of “new wars” in contemporary conflicts and 
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their relation to the financial factor. In the “new wars”, several changes in warfare have been 
associated to the multilateral interventions, to the emergence of new actors, to an increase in 
civilian casualties, to the blurring between the military and civil spheres22, to the complexity 
of war aims and last, but not least, with the information technologies. 
Multilateral interventions have become more frequent in conflict areas because the “new 
wars” are not only local but also global wars. The international actors23 have become more 
involved by creating select units and committees and their networks have multiplied. Münkler 
argues in the article The Wars of the 21rst Century, that failed states are unable to resolve its 
internal conflict once its lost power to the warlords. In this case, only outside powers are 
capable of intervening in the internal conflict. However, as Münkler notes, there is doubt 
whether outside powers will contribute to peace, or instead become part of the conflict 
(Münkler, 2003: 16). The consequences of such interventions are that these conflicts might 
become transnational conflicts. Münkler argues the transnational war is related to the 
emergence of globalization and the blurring of state boundaries. Münkler, argues that the main 
features of transnational wars are the networks among the criminal groups which help to 
fragment the monopoly of violence and break down the state institutional authorities. With an 
increase in intrastate and transnational wars, there is also an increase in civilian casualties. 
Münkler argues that since the end of the twentieth century the profile of the victims has 
dramatically changed, with there being more than 80% of those killed and wounded were 
civilians, and only 20% being soldiers on active service (Münkler, 2005: 14). There are no 
confrontations between enemies because there is no need to wage war for a decisive military 
 
22Additionally, in new wars, there is a blur between public and private, internal and external, economic and 
political, civil and military and the legitimate bearers of arms and the non-combatant or criminals have become 
blurred (Kaldor, 2012: 22). These distinctions also call into question the distinction between war and peace 
(Kaldor, 2012: 31). It means that the act of violence cannot be easily distinguished as legitimate and non-
legitimate. 
23 According to Duffield (2001), NGOs became increasingly related to conflicts, as well as donor governments, 
international financial institutions (IFIs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and the UN.  
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confrontation. Instead, violence constitutes a benefit for the continuation of the war. As 
Münkler argues that in the logic of “new wars” war must continually feed war," and therefore 
these types of wars can meet no precise end (Münkler, 2005: 17). 
With the movement and concentration of people from rural areas to the urban cities, the 
population became pluralistic and intermarried. As a result, a plurality of religions coexists 
within one area, which is “new wars” results in ethnic conflict and grievances. Therefore, there 
is more conflict in the main cities of the failed states. However, the ethnic conflict is greatly 
affected by another essential aspect of the “new wars”, which is the emergence of the 
complexity of actors. The state once was the primary entity for waging war for national interest, 
with own standing armies and clear distinctions among several spheres24. However, in “new 
wars”, the state has difficulties in maintaining domestic order. Besides the emergence of several 
non-state actors who illegitimately use force to attain control over the territory have further 
promoted state failure and economic underdevelopment. Furthermore, the complexity of actors 
in “new wars” is highly dependent on external support, which is responsible for eroding the 
state power and ends up prolonging conflict (Kaldor, 2012: 125). The complexity of actors can 
produce an ongoing conflict through the development of networks. These networks can work 
as a source of private support, such as the diaspora networks, NGO's, private security 
companies, mercenaries, local warlords, guerilla groups and agents of organized crime, and as 
a source from public support from actors such as sponsor states and international agencies. 
From the several emergent non-state actors, another significant issue which arises in “new 
wars” is the mix of interests. The complex interplay of players in an armed conflict, encourages 
the emergence of war economies, in regions of high informal economic activity. Therefore, the 
 
24. Distinctions between the public and private; internal and external; economic and political; civil and military; 
legitimate bearer or arms and the civilians or criminals; which according to Mary Kaldor have become blurred 
during the 20th century and further in the new wars.  
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complexity of players is termed as the war entrepreneurs because war is a "highly profitable 
and lucrative for individuals and groups within a society" (Berdal, 2004: 484). For instance, 
the blur between the political and economic motivations means that it is hard to identify the 
immediate interests of the agents involved, be it political or economic reasons. That is because 
some agents might act for economic interests which are disguised employing political violence, 
and then there are those who gain access for political interests through funding from illicit 
activity (Kaldor: 2013). Since the activity of criminal groups and elites are intertwined, the 
“new wars” dynamic depends on these state-based and non-state groups which interrelate their 
interests to achieve a specific goal out of the conflict. Besides, the developments in warfare 
technologies further create concerns when these can be appropriated by non-state actors.  
In the book Dehumanization of Warfare by the authors, Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg Robert 
Frau, and Tassilo Singer, the new warfare methods are increasing and presenting with new 
implications from an ethical perspective.  
From an ethical perspective, it can be questioned whether or not the decision 
over life and death of a human can be delegated to a machine or a computer 
process and if autonomous weapons or code are able at all to act in an ethically 
correct manner. (Heinegg, Frau, & Singer, 2018: 7) 
The new warfare is characterized by a high technological development, and the use of 
technologies such as drones, weaponized robots, and sophisticated computer programs that 
function at high efficiency and speed while employed in war. The rapidity and the complexity 
with which the machine can automatically make decisions becomes an attractive new method 
for waging war without human help.  Moreover, these authors define the autonomous process 
as ''dehumanization of warfare," which means that humans are needed less and less in the 
process of war-making. Also, if the process of decision making becomes automated, the less 
will the human partake in the vital decision of war, which consequently leads to humans 
everywhere become exposed to the dangers of war technology.  
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Considering that there is an emergence of a range of actors in the intrastate conflicts, the 
technologically developed mode of warfare becomes an effective means to asymmetrical 
warfare. In the Report of the 2016 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
Systems (LAWS), the concern on the development of the LAWS in warfare. A concern is that 
LAWS could be potentially acquired by non-state actors who can easily take advantage of these 
new war methods.  
On the other hand, the democratic states have also been attracted in using these means to fight 
against the guerilla type of warfare, by replacing human soldiers for the new methods. 
Democratic states also engage, according to Heinegg, W. H., Frau, R., & Singer, T. (2018) in 
the “remote piloting, automated attack technology and cyber techniques into the array of 
instruments applied by states in order to address perceived threats more effectively” (Heinegg, 
Frau & Singer, 2018: 208). Nevertheless, the primary concern of these authors is to analyze 
whether international law can adequately regulate the development of these autonomous 
weapons and weapons system. According to the article on Taking on Killer Robots,  it is a 
current subject of concern for many countries because these automated methods are very likely 
to undermine human dignity in the future. It is essential that their development is controlled for 
the use of war because machines cannot have human and moral reasoning (Docherty, 2014).  
At the same time, the critics of autonomous weapons systems discourage the idea of there being 
a completely autonomous system that could go offhand because there is always human 
involvement in their commands. However, considering that human involvement will still be 
widely present in controlling the autonomous systems, the insecurity arises from the potential 
hacking attacks on these autonomous systems, by non-State actors (Michael, 2013a).25  
 
25 MICHAEL, Schmitt, N. “Autonomous weapon systems and international humanitarian law: a reply to the 
critics.” Harvard Law School National Security Journal. 2013, February 5. Available at: 
http://harvardnsj.org/2013/02/autonomous-weapon-systems-and-international-humanitarian-law-a-reply-to-the-
critics/ (accessed 7/06/2019). 
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In the “new wars”, the used methods for achieving political goals rarely occur through the 
battles against one enemy. Instead, the local actors in a territory rely upon of forcible removal 
of a different identity or a different opinion. For instance, Fig. 2, a graphic on the Trends in 
Violent Political and Ethnic Conflict 1946-1990, shows the magnitude of societal conflict in 
three types of warfare trends: ethnic warfare, political warfare, and Interstate warfare. Ethnic 
warfare26 Has been on the increase and reached a peak during the early 1990s period yet 
remaining higher than the Interstate conflict. The survey also adds that this graphic is 
constructed based on every major conflict which is rated on a 10-point scale: “The Rwandan 
genocide rates a 7 on this scale, ethnic war in Kosovo is rated 4 the U.S. and UK air campaign 
against Iraq in 1998-1999 rates a 1.” (Gurr & Khosla, 2001).  
 
Source: Gurr & Khosla, 2001 
Additionally, it can be argued that there are reasons for economic greed are a cause of high 
civilian casualties. According to Münkler, “In new wars, extreme violence is used to intimidate 
an unarmed civilian population into doing whatever the armed group commands." (Münkler, 
2005: 15). In “new wars”, methods for achieving goals are usually violent and deliberately 
 
 
26 Humanitarian law violations occur from the ethnic cleansing, meaning the "expulsion of an undesirable 
population from a given territory due to religious or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic or ideological 
considerations, or a combination of these" (Bell-Fialkoff, 110). The definition includes such violations as forced 
emigration, population exchange, deportation, and genocide.  
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targeted at civilians, which is noticeable through the refugee flows, poor districts, and starving 
populations. In addition to these, according to Kaldor, 2012, "expulsion can be done through 
mass killing and forcible resettlement, as well as a range of political, psychological and 
economical techniques of intimidation” (Kaldor, 2012: 9). Frequently, armed violence is 
associated with the epidemics and starvation issues; that is, those who possess arms get to 
control the unarmed people to get food and services foreign aid services in the first place.  The 
purposes for the use of violence against civilians according to Münkler include the 
displacement from a specific area of a group of ethnically different population and methods 
such as "annihilation of the whole sections of the population, force it to supply and support 
certain armed groups on a permanent basis" (Munkler, 2005: 14). 
Also, the poor living conditions, the use of violence sustains the continuations of war, which 
becomes a profit activity for local warlords and transregional entrepreneurs as they begin to 
claim areas of control within a failed state power. Added to this, the recruitment of members 
from the refugee camps, warlords also have on disposition a cheap instrument for wielding 
violence against civilians. Warlords and terrorists often rely on children to carry out missions. 
These child soldiers do not have the same awareness of the consequences of the use of force 
against civilians. For warlords, they become a cheap option because they do not need to be 
trained for long periods. Children are given weapons, specially designed for their little 
dimensions. The development of firearms developments led to decreased weight and size, yet 
with a fast-firing frequency. Child soldiers become criminals, and holding weapons is an 
opportunity to obtain food, clothes, status, or other desirable things. However, children are 
victims that are dragged into conflicts without understanding the consequences they action. For 
effect, criminal groups drug children which makes them violent. According to Nevers, the table 
on the next page represents the list of conflicts in which children are used as combatants by 
state or non-state actors (Nevers, 2006: 383). These actors are divided under the following 
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categories: Governments, Paramilitary Organizations, and Armed Opposition Groups during 
the years 2000-2001. 
 
Source: Nevers, 2006: 383 
These wars result from mixed interests that are hard to pin down, which makes these types of 
war even more complex to deal and bring to peaceful negotiations among players. As discussed 
before, the complexity of actors usually functions as private enterprises and take advantage of 
a region's natural resources, trade of illicit goods and services, and support from external 
sources. These paramilitary groups must find ways to finance themselves, apart from the state 
apparatus. Therefore, violence is directed against civilians.27 It is often overlooked that the 
ethnic cleansing campaigns are often part of the economic motivations and are not “carried out 
by government troops but rather by irregular civilian forces” (Bell-Fialkoff, 1993: 119). 
Moreover, since most of the combatants can be of any background, including mostly criminals 
these result consequently in undisciplined armies, who are willing to use force on civilians 
because there is no military code to punish these paramilitary groups. Another aspect that 
Kaldor argues that in “new wars” it becomes hard to distinguish between “combatants as the 
legitimate bearer of arms and non-combatants, or between soldier or policemen and the 
 
27 Since these players act based on economic reasons, innocent civilians, especially young children, women, and 
older people are the most vulnerable in these circumstances  (Münkler: 2005, 20). 
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criminal” (Kaldor, 2012: 6).  These criminal soldiers often practice looting, robbery, raping, 
and mutilation of victims. They also limit access to the unarmed people the foreign aid 
provision of food and basic needs, making them live in starvation and poor hygiene conditions 
and disease. 
The international intervention solution to providing aid in zones of conflict has usually 
followed the logic of the traditional war. In worse cases, Humanitarian Intervention even 
becomes an essential center for sustaining the criminal and violent groups in the new war. For 
instance, warlords profit significantly from the provision of humanitarian aid by taking control 
over aid camps for people in need. Besides, any negotiations that try to bring compromise from 
these criminals of war can result in the legitimization of their war operations. These operations 
are often based on exclusivist traditions, which further worsens the conflict (Kaldor, 2012: 11).  
The international relief, according to Münkler, constitutes "an inexhaustible source of profit 
to the warlords" as these warlords also get mixed among the suffering unarmed population and 
get to assert their control from possessing arms. (Münkler, 2005: 18). Therefore, international 
aid contributes to a local war economy in the context of failed states. That is, the international 
member states have too often not been able to see through the state as ´failed.´ Consequently, 
it often helped to "resuscitate failed states by sponsoring elections and committing to long-term 
security protection" (Ignatieff, 2005: 138). 
According to Kaldor, wars used to be symmetrical, since battles were among similar opponents, 
but with the technological development, the war became more destructive and difficult to win. 
However, by the second half of the twentieth century a new type of organized violence 
emerged, that is, the rise in a mixture of small intensity conflict strategies28. The “new wars” 
borrow from the techniques of asymmetrical warfare, which becomes especially influential 
 
28 It is usually argued that the Cold War period of the arms race obscured the existence of low-intensity conflicts.   
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in the era of globalization. Theorists such as Mary Kaldor and Martin Van Creveld argue that 
Clausewitz logic of warfare has become obsolete to the contemporary wars29. In the place of 
armies organized and controlled by sovereign states are getting replaced by illegitimate groups 
such as terrorists, guerillas, bandits, and robbers, who are more likely to be motivated by 
fanatical, ideological-based loyalties, within the growing ethnic and religious type of conflicts 
(Williams, 2008: 155). 
These types of wars were called according to Kaldor, “uprisings, insurgencies or, more 
recently, low-intensity conflicts” (Kaldor, 2012: 17). The new type of wars derives from the 
type of war termed as low-intensity conflicts. This form of military conflict is characterized 
using light and easy to acquire weapons and “unconventional military strategies” from the 
engagement of state agents but also of non-state groups, and para-soldiers, such as mercenaries 
enrolled by war entrepreneurs (Jackson 2007: 121). Since conflicts are part of the internal 
disputes, and there are multiple actors, the military forces involved have been increasing 
considerably, especially in the 1990s. According to Kaldor (2012), "the new wars are 
characterized by a multiplicity of types of fighting units, both public and private, state and non-
state, or some kind of mixture" (Kaldor, 2012: 96). Also, the armed forces and security services 
are provided by private security companies to the complexity of actors30, including UN 
multilateral peace operations (Williams, 2008: 411).  Therefore, in the “new wars”, there are 
more and more private security services while state military forces are in decline. According 
to Williams, the private security companies provide with “services in operational support31, 
military advice and training, and logistical support…international security services, crime 
 
29. Although there have always existed forms of warfare such as terrorism and guerilla wars, these types of armed 
conflicts seemed to be obsolete because the decisive battle was a central part of war during the seventeenth and 
the eighteenth century. 
30 According to Williams, military, and security services are provided "to states, international organizations, 
NGOs, global corporations and wealthy individuals" (Williams, 2008:441).   
31, For instance, Sandline Executive Outcomes (EO) have deployed armed personnel in countries such as Sierra 
Leone and Angola (Williams, 2008: 443).  
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prevention, and intelligence" (Williams, 2008:443). Since the PCSs have become more 
mainstream in the internal conflicts, so is the need for an international regulation for these 
private security companies. Initially, the Geneva Convention was designed for the type of the 
old wars termed by Kaldor, fought by regular state armies. However, the Geneva Convention 
is still essential in times of guerrilla warfare and global terrorism. (Nevers, 2006: 374). An 
essential point that the Geneva Convention should incorporate is the international regulation of 
private security firms, as this is a global industry so that private security companies do not 
commit war crimes32 
The information technology becomes a significant factor in the “new wars”, particularly in 
the underdeveloped world, because technologies allow a rapid spread of information and 
bringing attention to the effects of the conflict.   The new forms of communication allow for 
an extension of global connections among criminal networks, diaspora links, international 
organizations, non-governmental organizations, and journalists (Kaldor, 2013: 4). The Global 
connections among different organizations and the ́ communication´ become a new tool of war, 
that is, for instance, to spread panic and conflicts usually become not only local but also global. 
According to Williams, the paramilitary movements “use the new media to publicize their 
actions, promote their cause and air their grievances” (Williams, 2008: 181). The fast 
communications allow for identity politics to become not only local and global but also 
transnational, and its main effects are the diaspora community support (Kaldor, 2012: 8). 
Besides, criminal networks exist, spread, and communicate regionally and globally in multiple 
locations at the same time. The information technology has also become a part of new criminal 
 
32. Furthermore, in addition to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, prohibits the participation of children 
under fifteen years old armed conflicts, which otherwise is considered a war crime under the statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Nevers, 2006: 392). 
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opportunities and led to the formation of transnational criminal networks33 (Williams, 2008: 
455).  
In conclusion, the context of the “new wars” is different from the old wars in the methods, aims 
goals, and finance. The main challenge becomes their persistence and recurrence. Therefore, 
“new wars” are characterized to have no clear beginning with no end in sight. The complexity 
of actors and their motivations encourage state destruction and failure because there is more 
benefit for the criminal groups to keep benefiting from the political and economic ways from 
the violence. Therefore, in “new wars”, there is a dismantling of the state rather than state-
building. However, there are some critics of the theory of “new wars” that argue that “new 
wars” are not new. 
1.3.Critique and defense of the “new wars” theory 
The “new wars” theory has critics point to whether the “new wars” are a new category or are 
the same as the traditional wars. Most of the critics find that there are especially many 
similarities with the Thirty Years War period, before the modern state-building process. Thirty 
wars are similar in a lot of aspects because there was a mixture of private enrichment, hunger 
for personal power, political ambitions for expansion beyond its borders into the neighboring 
territory, intervention to save certain values and internal struggles for power34 (Münkler, 2003: 
3).  
Critics of “new wars” point the opposite. For them, violence is decreasing, and the casualties 
associated with civilians. While the twentieth century has been considered the most turbulent 
 
33 Furthermore, is that crime networks create links among other dangerous transnational networks related to 
terrorist groups and weapons proliferation (Williams, 2008: 456)   
34. The collapse of Yugoslavia and Afghanistan is such examples of wars like the Thirty Wars period. Also, 
Newman (2004) argues that “new wars” aspects are not peculiar to the new wars, but rather, they have manifested 
throughout all periods of history (Newman, 2004: 181).   
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period in rising levels of violence, this fact is not valid. According to James L. Payne in the 
article Violence in the Twentieth Century, argues that violence has been decreasing compared 
to previous periods in history35. Just like Payne (2002), Rosling (2018) argue that today's 
conflicts are mediatized, which creates widespread fear. Mass media is willing to cover 
conflicts and give the “impression of a highly violent world, no matter the actual trend” (Payne, 
2002: 454).  
At the same time, critics, such as Kalyvas (2001), Newman (2004) and Singer (2002) argue 
that “new wars” are not new. For them, the nature of conflict has not changed, which means 
violent conflict is the same as in the past. Singer (2002) argues that “new wars” are the same 
as old wars only they have been put into an "amalgam of different types of "old wars" (Singer, 
2002: 166). Newman (2004) argues that the apparent changing patterns of “new wars” are in 
fact, not real or have been overstressed. Moreover, academics seem to be more engaged in 
understanding the dynamics of conflicts, especially, because of the emergence of media and 
communication, which tend to broadcast the most violent conflicts (Newman, 2004: 179). 
According to Kalyvas (2002), aspects such as looting were already practiced well before the 
twentieth century (Vietnam War and French Revolution), old civil wars were not always not 
always ideological (p. 107), rebellions were not always based on widespread popular support 
(p.110), and extensive violence against civilians existed in the past wars as well (p.110). For 
Kalyvas, there is still no "exact mechanism that link funding and war and how they affect how 
civil wars are fought remain inadequately specified" (Kalyvas, 2002: 117). Additionally, 
according to Kaldor, critics such as Mueller and Berdal do not consider “new wars” as a war, 
because they see the “new wars” to be purely based on privatizes and criminal violence (Kaldor, 
2013: 7). 
 
35 As Payne argues "it is misleading to treat this one-hundred-year period as if it were a single point in time…" 
(Payne, 2002: 499)  
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Mary Kaldor considers that “new wars” are new because critics overlook some essential 
distinctions between concepts such as identity politics36 And ideology and hybrid warfare and 
mixed warfare (Kaldor, 2012: 5). Most importantly, many of the critics are comparing “new 
wars” to civil wars, which they are not because they include the state as well as non-state actors 
(Kaldor, 2013: 2). Furthermore, Kaldor argues that globalization is a crucial element in the 
dynamics of “new wars”. There are dangers associated with globalization, such as conflicts 
spreading across borders. The spread of conflicts is associated dramatically to the complexity 
of actors. For instance, Münkler argues that state power has fragmented among distinct actors. 
These actors are termed by Münkler as "war entrepreneurs" to describe a range of “new wars” 
actors whose primary motivation is greed. These war entrepreneurs take advantages in the 
disintegration of the state and the breakdown of existing democratic institutions. These 
circumstances create an opportunity for the warlords to start profiting in economic ways and 
further allowing them to hurt the state capacity. Therefore, over time, these wars tend to spread, 
persist, and recur for decades.   
In conclusion, the elements that Kaldor considers that defends that “new wars” are new, are the 
phenomenon of globalization, technology, and the changing patterns which were characterized 
above. The new wars are the asymmetrical type of war which uses the methods which 
globalization brought to the new era of increased interconnection and state erosion, especially 
of the weaker states. Asymmetric strategy tends to spread the violence and “permeate all 
domains of social life” (Münkler, 2003:20). The asymmetrical warfare uses the "community as 
a cover, and a logistical base" (Münkler, 2003: 20)37. The next part deals with the issues of the 
 
36 According to Kaldor, “identity politics is about the right to power in the name of a specific group” unlike the 
conquest based on an ideology” (Kaldor, 2013: 6).  
37. The insurgency is a guerilla type of strategy that uses destabilization techniques which seek to create fear and 
hatred, especially using civilians as targets which points to the issue to the violations of human rights against 
innocent civilians. In the book by William Patterson (2016), Insurgencies are active on a grassroots level and 
involve outside assistance, which is the most crucial factor for succeeding (acquire manpower, supplies and moral 
support). On the other hand, there is usually a ´Metropolitan state,´ which helps the host state to fight against 
insurgents and keep control against a sudden escalation of the conflict (which affects the public welfare). 
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state erosion and the breaking down of institutions, that also has a strong relation, to the 
political, social and especially to the economic domain. 
1.4.State erosion and the breaking down of institutions 
One of the most important aspects to understand the “new wars” and the shadow economy is 
the state erosion and the breaking down of institutions. A robust state means that there is a 
healthy democratic, institutional and economic development38. However, the increase in 
intrastate wars and globalization39 After the Cold War period have both negatively contributed 
to the developing countries. While major capitalist networks have concentrated within the 
Western World and the Northern regions of the world, the South remained in disparity. In the 
case of the developing countries, the inability to build a stable state and maintain internal order 
because of continued poverty and conflict has created global instability40. Developing states in 
Asia, Africa41, Latin America and Eastern Europe have been struggling in achieving a stable 
democratic state with stable economies as the Western countries. That is because the process 
of state-building is difficult and time-consuming. It also largely depends on the decisions of 
the leaders of the state. It is argued that many economies, especially on the peripheries during 
the Cold War period, were not successful in transitioning into a market economy as expected 
 
Counterinsurgencies vary region to region where cultural and geographic conditions are different and must mainly 
engage in protecting the local population. In Counterinsurgency just as in insurgencies, the population is the 
objective. Therefore, when possible, counterinsurgencies often engage in limited military warfare in guerilla wars. 
Through the establishment of a secure environment for the civilians, the state legitimacy is built, and less is the 
possibility of an increase in insurgent groups. 
38 According to Williams “economic development is critical to sustaining the peace in states that have just ended 
a civil war” (Patterson, 2008: 239).  
39 Globalization is seen as a contributor to expanding criminal networks, illegal markets, and put a burden on the 
state's economy, which according to Moises Naím "makes the task of fighting global networks more difficult" 
(Naím, 2003:20).  
40. This instability arises from the shift in the North-South relations regarding development.  According to 
Duffield, social transformation is accompanied by "bringing together governments, NGOs, military 
establishments, and private companies in new ways" (Duffield, 2001: 13). 
41 In Africa and Asia, especially the major challenge for internal state order are ethnic conflicts (Diamond, 1987: 
117).   
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after the end of the Cold War period42. According to Diamond (2008) argues that poor people 
lack a channel for political participation: 
Elsewhere in the developing post-communist worlds, democracy has been a 
superficial phenomenon, blighted by multiple forms of bad governance: 
abusive police and security forces, domineering local oligarchies, incompetent 
and indifferent state bureaucracies, corrupt and inaccessible judiciaries, and 
venal ruling elites who are contemptuous of the rule of law and accountable to 
no one but themselves…There are elections, but they are contests between 
corrupt, clientelist parties.(Diamond, 2008: 38).  
It is generally argued that the phenomenon of globalization has contributed to a noticeable state 
erosion and the fragmentation of the monopoly of violence. That is, through the increased 
alliances, institutions, organization, and global interconnectedness, the state has less decision 
power.  According to Kaldor, the state's monopoly of violence has eroded, from above and 
from below, because of globalization. There is the erosion of the state monopoly of violence 
from above because states became part of various international organizations which have 
become "increasingly embedded in a set of international rules and institutions" (Kaldor, 2013: 
4). That is the state gives up some of its sovereign power to the international institutions which 
decide for the whole international community.  
Besides, Kaldor argues that the state monopoly of violence got eroded from below because the 
state becomes increasingly weaker under the globalization inequality among states. Moreover, 
the state loses power over its necessary competencies as the monopoly of violence gets eroded 
by weak institutions that cannot provide the necessary public services in such authoritative 
sector as the armed forces, police, and legal courts. In consequence, the state is incapable of 
providing the same level of defense, security, and justice within the territory. The power of the 
 
42. For instance, Kaldor (2012) states that "the end of the Cold War could be viewed as how the Eastern bloc 
succumbed to the inevitable encroachment of globalization…" (Kaldor, 2012: 9). 
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monopoly of violence is an essential feature of the modern state, but once it is lost, the state 
competencies get fragmented through non-state actors. According to Duffield: 
When the competence of nation-states begins to change, and they become 
qualified and enmeshed within non-territorial and networked relations of 
governance, one can assume that the nature of war has also changed (Duffield, 
2001: 13). 
Kaldor argues that "the establishment of standing armies under the control of the state was an 
integral part of monopolization of legitimate violence which was intrinsic to the modern state43 
(Kaldor, 2012: 19). However, armed forces are replaced by another type of soldiers, such as 
mercenary armies who are employed by private entrepreneurs. Warlords get blurred with state 
authority when the state collapses. Consequently, warlords begin to take control of the state's 
government to target the civilians in order to enrich themselves. In the case of the contemporary 
type of wars, these involve a complex web of both state and non-state actors44. One such 
example of how the range and complexity of actors can eventually fragment the state power is 
the case of Afghanistan. In this case, the warlords were part of local and regional networks, 
and they derived from tribes or clan leaders. De Nevers (2006) gives the example of 
Afghanistan, where a range of warlords started to compete against one another for power. 
Consequently, these warlords have divided the country into local and regional warlords 
(Nevers, 2006: 379). Besides, these warlords became war entrepreneurs. That is, Afghanistan 
continued to struggle even after the overthrow of the Taliban control from the capital, as these 
warlords’ power and violence were continued because of the opium economy (De Nevers, 
2006: 379). The conclusion that can be taken from this case is that ongoing violence is 
 
43." The state armies fought these battles against other state armies. 
44. Therefore, the Just war, or jus ad Bellum, can never be conducted in the name of the state interest and therefore, 
war cannot be legitimate tool under such conditions.   
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associated to the inexistence of law and because of the fragility of a failed state, the territory 
becomes an ideal place for sheltering warlords and terrorists.  
Furthermore, according to S. Haggard and R. R. Kaufman, new democracies find it hard to 
manage political and economic challenges, this can mean democratic breakdown. If the state 
loses control over the territory and the monopoly of violence gets fragmented, the state 
becomes ´weak´ or ´failed´ and is incapable of providing necessary security and order thought 
legitimate and trusted authorities. As Diamond argues in the article The Democratic Rollback, 
although there was a definite rise in democracies after 1974, many democracies could not 
consolidate and "meet their citizens' expectations for freedom, justice, a better life, and a fairer 
society" (Diamond, 2008: 37). Effort applied for state consolidation is a task that is conducted 
in different for every country. The transition to democracy is different because economic 
liberalization is not a universal rule which could be applied in the same way everywhere in the 
world, as structures will always be different from those of the United States. (Diamond, 1995: 
26).  
However, there is an essential element in the transition to democracies, which is a civil society. 
The benefits of globalization are only viable for those states that can get a strong and 
independent civil society along with internal peace and form strong regional alliances 
(Williams, 2008: 323). For Larry Diamond (1995), the transition to democracy can be achieved 
when there is a "revival of civil society, and the mobilization of all manner of independent 
groups and grassroots movements" (Diamond, 1995). A robust civil society has the effect of 
destroying nondemocratic regimes. Democratic consolidation can be only achieved through a 
healthy political society and its core 45 However, Diamond ( also finds some major caveats 
concerning Civil Society's degree of autonomy. That is, when there is too much autonomy, can 
 
45political part institutions, legislatures, elections, electoral rules, political leadership, and interplay alliances.  
36 
 
create such consequences as to a point where the State can no longer impose order. For instance, 
the "social and economic decay, along with the massive political corruption weakens the hold 
of the authoritarian-corporatist state, undermines the legitimacy of its sponsored associations, 
and may give rise to revolutionary movements like the Islamic fundamentalism" (Diamond, 
1995: 237). Therefore, in a robust state where diversity of colliding groups of civil societies, 
there must be the mediation of the various interests and balance of claims, as the state and its 
laws must maintain discipline among different civic groups. In “new wars”, a failed state is the 
result of the identity politics under the group in power, which seeks to impose their label on 
the rest. That is the ethno-nationalist elites give protection only to those who are members of 
the same ethnicity within a territory. 
Griffiths (2007) argues that in the setting of the new war, the elites do not democratically define 
the boundaries of the territory. Instead, the elites try to homogenize the population within the 
territory. For this, ethnic cleansing is commonly practiced, which constitutes a violation of 
human rights (Griffiths, 2007: 59). Moreover, warring groups benefit from the condition of a 
´failed state´ which is unable to provide the essential public goods and service. These 
circumstances are “characterized by violence, corruption, deteriorating infrastructure, and 
predatory ruling regimes…, rule by the gun wipes away any pretense of public authority" 
(Ignatieff, 2005: 137). Failed states are incapable of keeping economic development as there 
is an evident drop in the gross domestic product. Duffield (2001) explains that in failed states 
the current economy only amounts to about half or less the size of the total economic activity 
(comprises formally regulated investment, production and trade deals) in conflict countries.46 
According to Kaldor, the low GDP in a failed state occurs because it becomes harder for state 
authorities to keep control over the territory. Consequently, the collection of taxes decreases, 
 
46 According to Duffield the amount of GDP in some of the African countries is Angola with only a 10 % GDP, 
Mozambique with about half of the GDP, Kenya 40% of the GDP, and in Somalia with no official economy. 
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and there is a higher tendency for tax evasion, as well as increased corruption, identity politics, 
emergence in private agencies services. Besides, external pressure encourages to cut 
government spending and military fragmentation, which create more stress along with the 
continued decrease of state revenue (Kaldor, 2012: 96). 
As the state continues to weaken, the higher is the consolidation of the private forces of 
violence. Kaldor also notes that the broad mix of actors goes beyond the special forces, which 
can involve not only private but also state actors or non-state, which usually constitutes a 
combination of public and private actors. These actors then interrelate their economic activities 
and develop shadow economies which exist outside the economic governance systems, such 
as organized crime group of actors within political governments. The collusion between 
political and judicial authorities, for instance, creates opportunities for evading the rule of law, 
which works for a mutual economic benefit. Extralegal economies allow political actors to 
receive profits without prohibition and punishment. Elites gain from the circumstance of state 
failure because they get to control the export of valuable commodities, such as the export of 
drugs from Afghanistan. In “new wars” and ethnic conflicts, it is usually a wealth disproportion 
between the elite and the rest of the population, living in degraded conditions and violence. 
According to Goodhand (2000): 
today's conflicts are characterized by innovative long-term adaptations to 
globalization, linked to expanding networks of parallel (illegal) and grey 
(semi-legal) economic activity (Goodhand, 2000: 87). 
State failure is a consequence of the development of shadow economies which are 
characterized by the war economies of the “new wars”, which disrupt the vital process of state-
building capacity. This disruption constitutes an incentive for the emerging actors who benefit 
from the situation for financial gain. With the failure of the state power, the warring parties 
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find new ways to finance themselves through predatory exploitation of precious resources, 
through the illicit trade networks and the informal economies. 
In conclusion, the trend in Interstate armed conflicts has been decreasing both in frequency and 
in intensity. However, the sharp increase in Intra-state armed conflicts has had a significant 
impact on innocent civilians, which gives rise to insecurity not only on a local but also regional 
and global level. “New wars” are driven by economic aspirations, with political or ideological 
motivations playing only a minor role. This political economy of "new wars" reinforces the 
perpetuation of violence. Despite the external efforts of the international community, these 
types of war tend to persist. This circumstance creates additional challenges for the 
International community related to the role of economic motivations and agendas. In the next 
chapter, the war economy and shadow economy are going to be defined and discussed as to 











Chapter II: War Economy and Transnational Networks 
We ask for peace and freedom for the many men and 
women subject to old and new forms of enslavement 
on the part of criminal individuals and groups. ― 
Pope Francis, 2015 47 
The emergence of the shadow economy is closely connected to state failure, which is the 
incapability of the state to sustain the physical control and physical coercion over the territory. 
The economy of war has the main issue, which is a war which encourages the persistence of 
violent conflict. Authors argue that greed and grievance are both the primary sources of conflict 
in a war economy, which are further exacerbated by other variables.48 Therefore, apart from 
political and social motivations, the economic factor is most associated with greed, as a primary 
cause to explain the endurance of the conflict that has no end in sight. In the “new wars”, the 
various intertwined interests of the various actors involved in a war economy are a complex 
dynamic which affects all spheres: social, economic, political, military. Besides, the 
continuation of violence and exclusivist policies are a sign of a connection to criminal networks 
which are tied to the economic underdevelopment, political crisis, and social disruption. The 
paramilitary groups49 become part of the politics of identity, as the monopoly of violence gets 
captures by political parties, who are eager to maintain their power at all costs. Therefore, it is 
considered that the contemporary wars should be characterized through the political economy 
approach to understand their persistence and adopt practical solutions. 
 
 
47 "Urbi et Orbi Message of his Holiness Pope Francis” Central loggia of the Vatican Basilica. 2015, April 5. 
Available at: https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/messages/urbi/documents/papa-
francesco_20150405_urbi-et-orbi-pasqua.html (accessed 7/07/2019). 
48 According to Sherman, such as "Poverty, social inequality, rapid economic decline, large numbers of young 
unemployed males, and polarized identity politics…illegal or extralegal behavior on the part of governments” 
(Sherman, 2001: 1). 




2.1 – Definition of War Economy in “New wars” 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the “new wars” follow a political economy approach to 
war, which considers the economic agendas. The discussion includes such definitions as war 
economy that can be defined as a set of economic activities which deliberately finance the war. 
According to Philippe Le Billon, this approach also includes the analysis on the collateral 
economic impacts of war, which negatively affect the economy and the economic strategies of 
war, which is a use of economic weapons directed to weaken specific groups (Le Billon, 2000: 
1). The main concerns that this author tries to bring to attention relate to the effects of the 
perpetuation of conflict by analyzing the issues in the wealth and power distribution. 
Furthermore, Le Billon also argues as Mary Kaldor and Herfried Münkler, that globalization 
has a significant impact on state failure, and considers that war profits is essential in 
understanding contemporary conflicts. According to Münkler, the economy of wars is 
characterized by 
high unemployment, high levels of imports and a weak fragmented and 
decentralized administration: ‘It could be said the war economy represents a 
new type of dual economy, typical of peripheral regions exposed to 
globalization' (Münkler, 2003: 13).  
In addition to this, Münkler also considers there is not enough consideration given to the 
globalization processes because there is an interweaving of intrastate players, whose interests 
result in the continuation of war. Therefore, globalization opened the doors for the belligerents 
to the world economy from which they benefit through the creation of networks and profit in 
economical ways. The world economy is usually linked to the phenomenon known as the 
shadow economy and works as a source of finances to the continuation of war (Münkler, 2003. 
10). Globalization affected the conflicts in this sense, especially since the end of the Cold War, 
when political constellations became more fragmented and contradictory. While during the 
Cold War, the two superpowers controlled the surrogate wars, in the post-Cold War period, 
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wars started to be more autonomous wars, whose duration no longer depends on the political 
goals but the availability of the continuation of the exploitation of resources. Therefore, as Le 
Billon argues, while contemporary conflicts are often characterized as internal conflicts or civil 
wars, the "dynamics of these conflicts are rarely purely ‘internal'  "(Le Billon, 2000: 3). 
The war economies which characterize so-called civil wars are in many cases 
sustained by links between belligerents and the global economy. To a large 
extent, it is because of global changes in the international economy and the 
associated weakening of the role of the nation-state that many contemporary 
conflicts last so long. (Le Billon, 2000: 3). 
The state becomes an instrument of power, and its capacity is directed at the benefit of a ruling 
party. This leads to the economic system to also be further informalized, and the shadow 
economy becomes an incentive to rulers, according to Le Billon "to counterbalance state failure 
by expanding their client networks…it has become easier for private interest groups to take 
over" (Le Billon, 2000: 4).50 Once, the criminal networks are confident in their power, the state 
of destruction continues, and war becomes a profit. 
According to Peterson, it is difficult to transition from a war economy to a peace economy. 
Following the definition given by Peterson, war economies contribute both to physical 
organized violence and political violence and are related to the extraction of revenue at the cost 
of violence and illicit activities. The opposite is the peace economies which are not reliant on 
economic relationships which benefit from the physical and organized political violence. The 
issue with a developed war economy is connected to peaceful economies, even if 
geographically distant. For instance, the trade of goods and services provided by criminal 
networks often enter the global market and brings financial benefit to the criminal groups. 
 
50 According to Le Billon, “The profits generated by these informal economies, controlled by personal interests 
within states, mafias, armed groups, and western multinationals, escape public scrutiny and serve no broad societal 
objectives (Le Billon, 2000: 4).50 
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According to Peterson, when addressing the economy of war, positive peace51 It is harder to 
achieve because eliminating the actors behind the violent conflict is not enough for ending a 
more severe structural issue affecting at a broader level. Therefore, as Peterson argues that:   
 In order to transform economies of war into economies of peace, both the 
structural facets (for example global inequalities and power relations which 
facilitate and encourage illicit economic activity) and physical facets of 
violence related to war economies (the more observable and tangible processes 
of economic exchange) must be addressed (Peterson, 2014).52  
In the report on Economics and Violent Conflict, according to Macartan Humphreys, 
inequalities should not be generalized. Instead, inequalities are specific to each country. They 
are grievances usually concerning the inequalities between ethnic groups or between the 
regions, also referred to as `horizontal inequality. According to Humphreys, in Figure 2, the 
graphics represent the income of people in a country related to the share of the population53. 
The horizontal inequality can be found in such countries as in the case of the African countries 
have the largest sizes of the shadow economy in the world and high horizontal inequality, which 
is attributed mainly to the monopolization of the political power by one group (Klugman, 1999: 
8). For instance, in Zimbabwe, the largest ethnic group is the Shona ethnicity, and even though 
the society is highly pluralistic, the country was led by a one-party system from the 1980s until 
the 1990s, which resulted from the merging of the two parties54 in the formation of a one-party 
system.   
 
51 Also, there is a distinction between negative peace and positive peace economy.  According to Peterson, while 
the negative peace prioritizes stability and an absence of immediate physical violence” with limited success, a 
positive peace economy is achieved when there is “no obvious association with direct/physical violence, and they 
are free of structural violence and support a just and sustainable peace” (Peterson, 2014:7).  
52 Peterson defines the forms of structural violence as the "process of accumulation of capital and power relations 
and imbalances in the geopolitical landscape; periphery regions, or persons exploited in order to ensure the status 
quo for more dominant, powerful actors" (Peterson, 2014: 6). 
53 The author shows that in the first graph The People form the North have a distribution among the 20% abysmal 
and 30% poor; and The People form the South are among the 30% rich and 20% very rich. 
54. The agreement between the parties (Zimbabwe African People's Union-Patriotic Front and ZANU PF), was 
settled in 1989. They were responsible for waging a guerilla war. “Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic 
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Moreover, in the report by Jeni Klugman (1999), the Complex Humanitarian Emergencies 
(CHE)55 have increased during the 1980s and early-mid-1990s, which is attributed to the causes 
according to the author to "failed development, political and institutional policies" (Klugman, 
1999: vi).  Besides the political and economic factors, Klugman relates the increase of CHE to 
an increase in horizontal inequality56. That is the horizontal inequality encompasses such 
factors as the unequal distribution of assets, state jobs, and social services among the social 
groups. For instance, the horizontal inequality is present in areas where there is a restraint of 
groups from the peripheries of the region to the economic opportunities, access to education 
and income-earning opportunities (Klugman, 1999: 8).  
According to the graphic by Humphreys, the distribution of income inequality is low among 
income classes between the North and the South, it is high in horizontal inequality, which 
means there is the poor distribution between the South and the North areas of the country. In 
the second graph, the opposite happens.57 The general income inequality is high, where 60% 
of the people are either too poor or too rich, and the middle constitutes 40%. However, 
horizontal inequality exists according to the first graph, because wealth is concentrated 
mainly in the North area of the country, as overall income inequality stays low, with instead 
40% being very poor or very rich. The effect of this distribution produces a higher chance of a 
rebellion surge caused by the created grievances (Humphreys, 2003: 4).  
 
 
Front).” African Democracy Encyclopedia Project. 2000, February. Available at: 
https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/zimparties1.htm (accessed 2/04/2019). 
55 According to Klugman the definition of Complex humanitarian emergencies as the "deep social crises in which 
large numbers of people die from war, displacement, disease, and hunger, owing to man-made disasters, although 
some may benefit" (Klugman, 1999: 1). 
56. Factors that contribute to an ongoing conflict are the horizontal inequality, failure of political institutions, state 
crisis, economic crisis, and external shocks (Klugman, 1999: vi). 
57 Where another country with the same average income has a different distribution. People of the North are 
distributed by the 20% poor and 20% rich, and The People from the South are represented by the 30% very poor 




Source: Humphreys, 2003: 3 
Moreover, according to Humphreys, during civil conflicts, governments usually tend to spend 
the state revenue on the military sectors rather than the social sectors. The government is also 
responsible for choosing policies during the conflict, which can be damaging for the economy 
on purpose so that political leaders extract profits for themselves and contribute to an increase 
in horizontal inequality among the ethnic groups or religious groups (Humphreys, 2003: 7)58. 
In addition, international corporations such as NGOs and foreign governments have both 
contributed to the war economy59. At the same time, the administrative state institutions 
collapse, and the foreign exchange losses over the natural resources create inflation. The 
consequences which result from a combination of decisions taken by the government in 
conjunction with the foreign actors, resulting in a higher probability of conflict, which affects 
and causes damages mostly to the rest of the poor population. Furthermore, when discussing 
the concept of war economy other concepts whose aspects relate to the war economy most 
pointedly, is the development of the shadow economy and its aspects affecting the economic 
development in states, the level of employment and the productivity of the country. 
 
58. The examples of these types of destructive economic policies, according to Humphreys are "weakening the 
state institutions …and destroying infrastructure for production, leaders may make rebellion more attractive" 
(Humphreys, 2003: 6). 
59 These foreign actors tend to direct sanctions which instead affect civilians than the policymakers; they can aid 
with military support and trade arms, and in the case of NGO's there is support by the oil corporations to the 
governments (Humphreys, 2003)  
45 
 
According to the OECD Statistics Brief, the concept of the non-observed economy (NOE) is 
often interchangeable with other concepts such as “hidden, grey, shadow, informal, informal 
and underground…can also refer to specific aspects of the NOE” (Gyomai & van de Ven, 2014: 
1). Moreover, the definition used by Medina, & Schneider, for shadow economy, is that this 
type of activity "includes all economic activities which are hidden from official authorities for 
monetary, regulatory and institutional reasons" (Medina, & Schneider, 2018: 4). Medina, & 
Schneider, explain that the monetary reasons include activities such as tax evasion, escape 
social security contributions, while the regulatory reasons include the regulation of the 
governmental bureaucracy, and the monetary activity includes corruption, the weak capacity 
of the political institutions and the rule of law (Medina, & Schneider, 2018: 4)  
According to the OECD Handbook, The Non-Observed Economy in the System of National 
Accounts, to the non-observed economy (NOE) includes five major areas, which are:1. 
Underground production, 2. illegal production, 3. informal sector production, 4. Production of 
households for own final use, 5. statistical underground; (Gyomai & van de Ven, 2014: 2)60. In 
general, these activities are practiced outside the legal framework and develop in any formal 
economy. However, what usually varies the size of the shadow economy from country to 
country and region to region. According to the definitions of these five areas, respectively, 
these economic activities tend to avoid tax payment or comply with regulations, also tend to 
engage in unlawful productive activities, have unregistered enterprises for productive 
activities, the goods and services are only available for the households that produce them and 
lastly, there are failures in the collection of basic data of these activities by the data collection 
programs. Additionally, according to the 2017 report by Friedrich Schneider and Robert 
Klinglmair, the definition by which they guide their study on the size of the shadow economies 
 
60 OECD Statistics Brief retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/sdd/na/Statistics%20Brief%2018.pdf  
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is that shadow economies are “those economic activities and the income derived from them 
that circumvent or otherwise government regulation, taxation or observation” (Schneider & 
Klinglmair, 2017: 4). These authors provide a table which represents the types of economic 
activities which are avoided from paying taxes to the state authority.  
 
Source: Schneider & Kinglmair, 2017: 5 
From this table, there are two categories from activities which are divided in the first line by 
illegal activities and the second in the legal activities. In the illegal type of activities, the 
monetary column includes some of the most profitable activities to criminals, while the non-
monetary transactions illegal goods such as drugs are used in exchange with other goods, use 
violent methods to obtain valuable goods which are for the own individual use. In the legal 
activities, the shadow economy is usually the activity of tax evasion, tax avoidance, which can 
also be divided into monetary and non-monetary transactions. The legal activities can be 
practiced by employers to avoid reporting the wages and salaries given for unreported work on 
legal term61, or the leaving unreported the earning out of self-employment. In the non-monetary 
transaction, there is tax evasion through legal services and goods by other services and goods, 
 
61 Such as the example given by Navickas, M., Juščius, V., & Navickas, V. (2019): “child-minding with income 
not declared” (Navickas, M., Juščius, V., & Navickas, V., 2019:3).  
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and lastly, the Do it yourself work also means unregistered work and tax evasion.62Moreover, 
the above table shows the primary motive for engaging in the shadow economy. The tax 
evasion and avoidance are, according to Navickas, M., Juščius, V., & Navickas, V. (2019): 
 1. To avoid payment of income, value-added, or other taxes; 2 .to avoid 
payment of social security contributions; 3. To avoid having to meet certain 
legal labor market standards, such as minimum wage, maximum working 
hours, safety standards; 4. To avoid complying with certain administrative 
procedures, such as completing statistical questionnaires or other 
administrative forms  "Navickas, M., Juščius, V., & Navickas, V.,2019: 3-4).63 
In order to measure the magnitude of the shadow economies studies such as the IMF Working 
Paper on the Shadow Economies Around the World: What Did We Learn Over The Last 20 
Years, makes estimations for “the average size of the shadow economy of the 158 countries 
over 1991 to 21015 is 31.9 percent” (Medina, & Schneider, 2018: 2). According to the article 
on Shadow Economy Poses Policy Challenge, an OECD report on the African countries64, Latin 
American countries65, and central and Eastern European countries had the largest shadow 
economies, during the 1999 to 2000 period. These constituted, respectively, about 41.3%, 
41.1%, and 38.1% of the GDP. Moreover, Schneider & Kinglmair, find that the size of the 
countries in Asia is much less when compared to the countries from Africa and the Latin 
American States because in Asia the majority of countries are "highly industrialized and 
developed countries" (Schneider & Kinglmair, 2017: 9). Some of the largest shadow economies 
are more prevalent in the African countries, according to the following figure: 66 
 
62 According to Navickas, M., Juščius, V., & Navickas, V. (2019) “building work is done by homeowner" or with 
the help of the neighbor; (Navickas, M., Juščius, V., & Navickas, V., 2019:3). 
63 However, their study is based only on the legal activity of the shadow economy.    
64 According to Medina, & Schneider  the country from Africa with the largest shadow economy is “Zimbabwe 
with 60.6 %, (Medina, & Schneider, 2018: 2) 
65 According to Medina, & Schneider, the country within Latin America with the largest shadow economy is 
Bolivia with 62.3 % of the GDP". (Medina, & Schneider, 2018: 2)  




smaller decrease in countries such as Moldova and Ukraine. Data source from Schneider & 
Kinglmair, 2017; and the Medina and Schneider (2018)68. Furthermore, considering the focus 
on the Eastern European countries, and particularly on the Balkan region, the specificity of 
this region is that Eastern European countries are young states which have formed after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. The post-Soviet Republics69 in the Eastern Europe had a 
different communist regime that left few chances of economic development, while post-Soviet 
Central European states had a communist regime which allowed them for instance for better 
economic freedom as the state was less pervasive in the area (Aliyev, 2015: 11). Informal 
economy is therefore higher in Eastern countries than in the Central European, and more likely 
to engage in corruption. The case of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has also been 
part of the communist economic model which led to later incentive in the consolidation of a 
larger shadow economy throughout the Yugoslavian Republics. The Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (1945-1991), received international recognition in 1945, under the communist 
revolutionary, Josip Broz Tito’s rule. Tito’s rule led to the adoption of a different economic 
model that from the other Eastern European countries, from the economic law passed in 1950s, 
in order to decentralize the economy and become market oriented (Uvalić, 2019: 7). Despite 
these reforms the economic system was largely guided by the socialist features of economy 
and it was not considered to be continually led by under the supervision of the party elites.  
The shadow economy is the highest in the South Asian, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America 
Caribbean regions whose sizes of the shadow economy vary different parts of the world. 
Therefore, the shadow economy must have elements and indicators which must be brought to 
analysis and be understood in conjunction with domestic conflict. In the first place, the shadow 
 
68 Retrieved from https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/shadow_economy/Europe/.     
69 In the journal by Aliyev, the idea of present informal economic and institutional challenges in the post-Soviet 
societies comes from the conditions of shortage, that is form the “economic shortage under Soviet systems of 
centralized planning, individuals and households developed all kinds of complex ways of negotiating access to 
scarce goods, based upon networks of reciprocal exchange” (Aliyev, 2015: 12). 
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economy affects political institutions within the state, and therefore, the social order, which 
then leads to a higher probability of ethnic conflict and rebellion. The political power is more 
and more contested among the corrupt elite for economic benefit, which goes hand in hand 
with the development in the shadow economy networks. In “new wars”, the shadow economy 
is usually characterized as an illegal activity that extends across borders. The warring parties 
rely on flexibility70 of the networks of the shadow economy to consolidate their power over the 
territory. Kaldor identifies five types of illegitimate actors71 Who materialistically benefits 
from the fragmented state physical coercion. These forces are often constituted from the 
remnants of conventional armed forces. Furthermore, these private groups72 are more 
challenging to distinguish from the legitimate armed forces, which are further delegitimized 
from acting on securing order within the territory. Also, political parties of failed states tend to 
govern73 in their benefit through the continuation of violence, so people are forced to comply 
with the rules of a government that supports exclusivism.  
One of the most evident features of the shadow economy is that the warring parties stop relying 
on the support from the state collection of taxes and engage in shadow activity. Shadow 
economy itself leads to economic decline because it contributes to the development of more 
straightforward trade in illegal goods and services, which then sponsors the political and violent 
activities of the warring groups within the territory. Additionally, the state loses its legitimacy 
for the collection of taxes from the citizens. The criminal groups find ways of raising revenues 
through the trade in illicit goods and services, and therefore, many of its activities are related 
 
70. The imposition of arms embargoes is another incentive for the arms dealer to find alternative routes by adjusting 
the networks to bring the demand in the supply of weapons by the rebel groups. Thought parallel routes the dealer 
can omit information about the products’ destination. 
71 The five types of illicit groups according to Kaldor are "paramilitary groups; self-defense units; foreign 
mercenaries; and finally, regular foreign troops, generally under international auspices" (Kaldor, 2012: 96). 
72 The reinforcement of the regular armies creates the opposite effect on the private security agencies, because 
there is less need for mercenary armed forces.  
73  Governments create their paramilitary groups and consolidate them as regular armed groups. 
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to violence and an economic crisis. Humphreys finds the relation between conflict and decrease 
of GDP. 
 
Source: Humphreys, 2003: 2 
As we can see in the figure above, presented in the journal Economics and Violent Conflict,  
when a country’s GDP is high, the wealthier and more prosperous is the country, the less is the 
possibility for conflict to occur. According to the graphic the  Probability of Conflict decreases 
and remains steady as the GDP increases. 
The first indicator for the increase in the size of the economy is the tax and social security 
contribution. Therefore, one of the main consequences of the shadow economy is the reduction 
of tax contribution to the state and social security contributions. Governments tend to increase 
tax rates which are caused by shadow economy and instead create the "incentive to join the 
shadow economy."74 Furthermore, as Münkler argues the elements of destructive tribalism and 
the emergence of globalization, has led to more violence. In turn, the continuation of violence 
is dependent on the extraction of revenue in the form of shadow economies (Münkler, 2007, 
10). Since the economy of “new wars” is characterized by high unemployment, higher imports 
than exports and weak, fragmented decentralized administration, under these conditions young 
males are forced to engage in the illicit activities of the shadow economies. (Munkler, 2007, 
 
74 “Shadow Economy Poses Policy Challenge.” European Business Review. 2005, April 22. Available at: 
https://www.europeanbusinessreview.eu/page.asp?pid=243 (accessed 10/04/2019). 
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13). The shadow economies contribute to decreasing sense of duty to paying taxes from the 
increase in corruption and loss of respect for public state institutions, in the absence of legal 
enforcement legislation75.  
According to Medina and Schneider, “The bigger the difference between the total labor cost in 
the official economy and after-tax earnings (from work), the greater the incentive to reduce the 
tax wedge76”(Medina and Schneider, 2018: 35). In this case, the costs in the labor market the 
hiring of employees costs more in terms of tax and social contributions that the employer must 
pay than the wage earner by the worker, which for instance is the case of the OECD countries 
(Schneider, 2000). This means that the tax wedge is more likely to be reduced and the more is 
the incentive to join the shadow economy. This type of shadow economy involves a second job 
and even during hours of work, and a third category is the employment of people who cannot 
legally be integrated into the official economy (Schneider, 2000). Also, for the economy, the 
low tax revenues lead to an inefficient public sector. With less competition77 in the private 
sector, the less is the quality of public goods in the market, which according to creates a vicious 
cycle, because the tax moral78 diminishes and the consequences are again taking a cycle in the 
formal economy (Krasniqi &Topxhiu, 2012: 9).  
The journal on The Informal Economy in Kosovo: Characteristics, Current Trends and 
Challenges, Florentina Xhelili Krasniqi and Rahmije Mustafa Topxhiu, illustrate the vicious 
cycle in the figure below, represented below. In this figure the vicious cycle happens when 
 
75 There is usually a high tax burden, which gets continuously avoided, and it is easier for criminals to conduct 
illegal activities (Gaspareniene: 2015, 653). 
76. The tax wedge is defined as the ratio between the amount of taxes paid by an average single worker (a single 
person at 100% of average earnings) without children and the corresponding total labor cost for the employer. 
77 Also relates to the market regulation, trade barriers mean higher prices,  can cause an incentive to join the 
shadow economy. These increase labor costs in the formal economy. (Medina and Schneider, 2018:35) 
78 Tax morale is the obligation to which the taxpayers stick to their obligations and are affected by the quality of 
the goods and services provided by the state. There is less change in the taxpayers engaging in the shadow 
economy if taxpayers are treated as tax partners rather than as tax subordinates in a hierarchical  relationship 
(Medina and Schneider, 2018: 35) 
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there is a large informal sector which develops from state’s ineffective regulatory and 
enforcement practices in the formal economic sector, which creates disincentives for private 
sector in participating in the formal economy. The informal sector becomes a solution to tax 
burden and costs that usually should facilitate a free -market economy, as well as the creation 
of new jobs in the formal economy. However, while it becomes difficult for the state to collect 
taxes, people are more inclined to move to the informal economy, from which results in a 
decrease in tax revenues to the state. If the state is incapable of effectively collecting taxes to 
have a budget for public services and goods expenditure, then people will see a decline in the 
quality of the public services provided by the state. The continuation of ineffective tax 
collection by the state then leads to the incapability of supporting the investments costs of the 
private sectors, which is crucial in maintaining a competitive and efficient market that will 
eventually create jobs. Therefore, as the government becomes ineffective in the regulation of 
the economy the incentives remain high for people to turn to shadow economic activities which 
do little to contribute for productive and effective economy, and so the informal sector becomes 
larger.  
 
Source: Krasniqi &Topxhiu, 2012: 9 
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Therefore, according to Medina and Schneider, “countries with higher tax rates achieved by 
lower tax rates and regulations, a better rule of law and lower corruption levels should thus 
have smaller shadow economies” (Medina and Schneider, 2018: 35). 
The second cause is related to the quality of the state institutions, which measures the control 
of corruption government effectiveness, (because a highly corrupt government is associated 
with a larger shadow economy); the rule of law (through securing property rights and enforcer 
of contracts, results in benefits in the formal economy); and regulatory quality (if the political 
institutions fail to promote an efficient market economy then businesses rely on underground 
activity); (Medina and Schneider, 2018:35) .  
The formal economy is associated with the level of development of the economy. If the 
development of the economy is low, then there will be fewer jobs in the formal economy, while 
the unemployment will be high, and so will the probability of people be practicing shadow 
economy. Additionally, people tend to be more self-employed, which means there is a type of 
income generated from informal employment without the employee legal norms79Besides the 
informal economy is also associated to low productivity, poverty, inferior working conditions, 
lack of social benefits, and access to the “capital, credit, technology, markets and institutions” 
(Krasniqi &Topxhiu, 2012: 8). For instance, the cause for increase in Eastern Europe for the 
shadow economy are factors such as increase in corruption, income inequality and tax burden 
on consumption, and what can diminish the shadow economy is the business freedom or an 
increase in the GDP per capita (Navickas, M., Juščius, V., & Navickas, V.,2019:12). 
 
79 According to Annex 2.A3 by OECD Employment Outlook: these “could include an employment contract, 
paying tax or social contributions, earning the minimum wage or entitlement to redundancy payments in the event 
of employment termination. "Retrieved from www.oecd.org/employment/outlook 
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The international market prices can sometimes incentive the production of illegal goods80, 
such as drugs which can be the alternative cropping to provide sustenance for rural farmers, 
and because there is a social exclusion of the poor and indigenous people, guerilla groups 
exploit these people for financial benefits. These criminal networks are a result of the increased 
privatization, in the context of the failed state, in which all economic power, even the formal 
economy gets captured by a variety of warlords. In a study by Martha Alter Chen (2012), the 
informal economy, although it was initially thought to support the poor people, in the 
developing countries, in order to curb the issue of the economic crisis because of the creation 
of jobs, the informal economy had the opposite effect. Initially, it was thought that the 
economic development in the developing countries would be transformed into modern 
economies and that traditional sector of jobs in the developing world would eventually 
disappear in the long run to ultimately reach a formal economy (Chen, 2012: 2). 
This perspective was reflected in the prediction by W. Arthur Lewis, in the 
1954 essay for which he received a Nobel Prize in Economics, that economic 
development in developing countries would, in the long-term, generate enough 
new jobs to absorb surplus labor from the traditional economy. This would 
lead to a turning point when wages would begin to rise above the subsistence 
level: what is referred to even today as the "Lewis Turning Point"  (Chen, 
2012: 2) 
However, as Chen argues, the informal economy81 kept thriving despite the efforts to develop 
the economy. The obstacles that arise is an imbalance between the rapid increase in population, 
as the rise in machines for production increased, which created few jobs to support the formal 
economy.  Concerns about the developing countries are about the changing patterns that might 
take a different turn than in the developed countries. While there are positive aspects of the 
informal economy, the negative aspects outweigh the positive ones. The variety of factors82 
 
80 This is the case of Peru, where prices for coffee and banana crops have dropped in the international market, 
which makes the production of cocaine more profitable, with free access to international markets (Sherman, 2001, 
5). 
81 Is associated with low paying jobs and unskilled workers (Chen, 2012: 2) 
82 These factors are economic, social, institutional, and even phycological (Krasniqi &Topxhiu, 2012: 2).  
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also, their interrelation creates the complexity of an informal economy and creates loses in the 
formal economic system. The formal economy is the opposite of the informal economy and 
seeks to create economic development. However, when the formal economy fails to provide 
with diverse opportunities according to the law, then the informal economy is preferred in times 
when state's institutions, polities, and regimentations create more costs and less opportunity, or 
less quality to the broader public. Therefore, there is an increase in unregistered activities to 
avoid paying taxes and avoidance to specific legal standards and administrative structures.   
Countries in the transition to democracy usually face the difficulties in the long run, yet the 
formalization of the economy is an indicator of a successful stabilization of regulatory 
institutions (Krasniqi &Topxhiu, 2012: 2). The same happens with the transition from the 
informal economy to the formal economy, which must be gradual so that measures will support 
those existing enterprises which could be incorporated into the formal economy. In a sense, the 
support can lead to the reverse in the  cases when the state is highly centralized and dominant 
to the point of giving opportunities in the formal economy only to limited elite, while in the 
informal economy people find opportunities by other means which, according to Krasniqi 
&Topxhiu, is the “a signal of entrepreneurial dynamism” Krasniqi &Topxhiu, 2012: 3). 
Besides, According to Schneider:  
a growing shadow economy may provide strong incentives to lure domestic 
and foreign workers and other resources away from the official economy. On 
the other hand, two-thirds of the income earned in the shadow economy is 
spent in, and actively stimulates the growth of, the official economy 
(Schneider, 2000).  
However, according to Schneider, it is also considered that by reducing the shadow economy 
it results in “a significant increase in tax revenues, and therefore to a greater economic growth” 
(Schneider, 2000). While some see a positive relationship between the shadow economy and 
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the official economy, others support that the decrease in the shadow economy will more likely 
lead to economic growth. 
In addition, the war economies represent the power in the hands of the warring groups who 
tend to exacerbate the identity politics, which serve as a means of survival for most people. 
That , according to Le Billon, the target population can be "marginalized via racist discourses 
and policies and denied political rights and access to resources" (Le Billon, 2000: 5). This 
means that usually in countries where the size in the shadow economy is large such as in 
African countries,  the developments of this type of conflict often tend to be destructive on the 
economy and on the civilians wellbeing. 
The impact that the war economy has on the population varied by its type, which according to 
Le Billon can be categorized as state war economies83, guerilla war economy, predatory war 
economy, foreign alliance war economy, humanitarian war economy, and commercial war 
economy. In a guerilla type of warfare, the armed groups are closely related to the local people 
and acquire their support through political persuasion or act in a strategic way and in most 
cases,  there is less violence against civilians except when counterinsurgency84 is directed at 
them. The guerilla type of armed groups employs the element of surprise and use light arms to 
bring the enemy down. An example of such war economy is the case of Sri Lanka, where an 
armed group by the name Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) established their own 
organization which requested large sums of money by force from people, businesses 
 
83 The state war economy  according to Le Billon is “organized by a structured political group (mostly states) 
through (quasi) legal taxation of revenues/ profits as well as foreign and domestic borrowing” (Le Billon: 2000: 
7).  
84 When civilians are targeted because of the counterinsurgency from outside powers such as the example provided 
by Le Billon in the bombing incident and “relocation of population to ´strategic villages´ in Indochina or Latin 
America (Le Billon, 2000: 8).  
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professionals and the Tamil diasporas abroad in Canada, U.K., France, Norway, and European 
countries.85 
The predatory economy of wars, on the other hand, created a harsher effect on the populations 
which is forced to work in order to get the financing. For instance, in the case of Mozambique, 
Renamo86 was recruited its members by force through kidnapping or abduction and its funds 
originated from the ´tax areas´ from which their members would take by force goods and 
services, and also, encouraged violent activity in support of the rebel group, and lastly, there 
were no distinction between military targets and civilians (Morgan, 1990: 608). 
In a foreign alliance, war economy is related to the neighboring economic and logistical 
support inside another country to maintain a military case with the assistance of a foreign 
country. This was the case of the Republic of Honduras in Central America. The Contras was 
a rebel group that opposed the Sandinista National Liberation Front, a socialist political party. 
The Contras, who had stated a counterrevolution, were aided by foreign support, such as 
Argentina's government that provided with military forces and training in Honduras, and due 
to the financial and military support from the US.87 This form of war economy has less impact 
on civilians.  
The humanitarian war economy is related to the humanitarian assistance camps which serve 
as sanctuaries not only to civilians in need but also, inadvertently to the armed groups, which 
take advantage of the assistance. In Bosnia’s case the humanitarian aid is related to a 
criminalized conflict, because humanitarian aid can serve as an opportunity for flowing 
 
85 GUNARATNA, R. “Is the LTTE a successful Guerilla Organization?” Asian Tribute. (2007/01/05)). Available 
at: http://asiantribune.com/node/3981 (accessed 7/06/2019). 
86 The Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) was a political movement directed against the FRELIMO 
party.  
87 Retrieved from https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/n-contras.php 
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criminal trade88, according to Andreas (2004), “safe areas…can turn into stable commercial 
center of black-market exchange” (Andreas, 2004: 50).  
The commercial war economy is the most known as the trade in illicit goods and services, as 
well as trade in the local resources. This form of war economy is very dominant in African 
countries. The military control allows the warring forces to control economically profitable 
areas and develop networks regionally. In these war economies, civilians are often exploited to 
do the work and limit the choice of their participation in other sectors of the economy. This 
war economy leads to the criminalization of the economy (Le Billon, 2000: 9). The example to 
this war economy is the main sectors include mainly the extraction of oil and diamonds in 
Angola.89 The criminalization of conflict is more likely in these types of war economy because 
the business of war becomes intertwined with the business of crime.  
The war economies lead to macroeconomic and microeconomic consequences. War economies 
contribute to macroeconomic consequences such as bad distribution of goods through the 
population, collapse of economic regulation, low trust, reduced investment, opportunistic 
behavior, falling incomes, emergence in parallel economies and illicit trade, hyperinflation. 
The microeconomic consequences affect the individuals such as their rights and powers, access 




88 The UN policing at the airport grounds in Sarajevo, and the 800 meter tunnel which was built underneath the 
Sarajevo airport provided a secure way to enter and exit the city and for the smuggling activities (people and 
materials were passing the tunnel on a daily basis, as well as flows of arms, ammunition, food, fuel) (Andreas, 
2004: 39).  
89 The Angolan Economy is rich in natural resources but continues to have poor GDP, with about 85% of people 
dependent on the subsistence agriculture and the country’s 90 % of the exports dependent on the oil export  
SAWE, B. E. “What Are The Major Natural Resources Of Angola?” World Atlas. 2018, December 12. Available 




2.2 – Primary sources for revenue raising and Transnational Networks 
The transnational networks are the often-called horizontal coalitions between the various 
groups in “new wars”, which can be pictured as a ‘spider-web' which according to Kaldor 
characterizes the structure of the global enterprise of illegal activities. The development of 
transnational networks becomes accessible once the irregular forces get in control of the state 
monopoly of violence. Moreover, the modern communications allow fast and effective 
communication among the warring groups and which the development of the channels in the 
shadow economy allows, for instance, an easy trade in cheap arms and illegal goods for the 
warring parties90. The consolidation of the shadow economy also takes states until it effectively 
becomes consolidated.  
Kaldor identifies three states in the development of the shadow economy, which is reflected in 
the different forms of assets. Kaldor refers to the first form of ‘asset transfer' as the primary 
sources of funding which are: "looting, robbery, extortion, pillage and hostage-taking," the 
second source is market pressure (Kaldor, 2012: 108). The first type of asset is the activity of 
the warring parties seizing civilian's houses, farms, domestic animals, money, valuables, shops, 
factories, and use people as hostages for exchange. The second asset is a way of revenue raising 
through the control of market prices, by forcing civilians to sell their assets for a meager price, 
and also set control over the supply of food and other necessities which lead to usually 
degrading living conditions affecting in great part women, children and elderly. Also, the third 
form of an asset according to Kaldor is termed as the ‘war taxes' or ‘protection money,' which 
are generated from the revenues of the trade of illegal resources, such as the trade in drugs, oil, 
arms, laundered money and other. 
 
90 For instance, the collapse of the Albanian state in 1997 and its political instability was one of the significant 
factors that contributed to the conflict in Kosovo because there was a sudden availability in "hundreds of thousands 
of Kalashnikovs" (Kaldor, 2012: 102).  
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Additionally, there is often another valuable source of revenue for the warring parties, which 
includes the humanitarian assistance with food and basic needs to most devastated zones of 
conflict. Members of the warring groups infiltrate into the crowd of the people who require 
assistance, yet the ones who are part of the warring groups get to control these people by 
intimidating with weapons.91 Furthermore, any economic incentives that warring groups could 
find, only act as an incentive for continuing violence and in the funding of continued political 
struggles.  
war economies do not simply refer to the state of an economy in times of 
conflict but are defined as the economic relationships and transactions which 
cause, sustain or prolong periods of physical, political violence or instances 
where actors take advantage of political violence for financial gain. 
(Peterson,2014: 4). 
Illegal trades emerge through the development of networks which become so complicated that 
it is difficult to follow their routes into the global market.92 According to Peterson, other 
commodities in war economies include: 
 activities such as human trafficking, organized crime, diasporic funding 
(either through voluntary contributions or extortion), money laundering, tax 
evasion, corruption, and even arms the use and manipulation of foreign aid 
(Peterson, 2014: 4).  
From this passage, Peterson identifies the four most productive activities in the shadow 
economy are the trade in natural resources, organized crime, human trafficking, and diasporic 
funding. The war economies became especially apparent after the end of the Cold War, as new 
war conflicts become related to economic greed and profit-seeking, especially in places where 
valuable natural resources93 Could be extracted and traded in the global market. Peterson 
 
91 As Kaldor argues, humanitarian assistance “might contribute to the functioning of the war economy” (Kaldor, 
2012: 95). 
92 For instance, the Lebanese networks took advantage of the conflict in Sierra Leone and developed a complex 
supply chain, through which, diamonds from Sierra Leone could clandestinely enter the global market (Studdard, 
2004: 5). 
93 Such as the exploration of natural resources: diamonds, timber, gold, oil, precious gems, and minerals like 
coltan.  Peterson (2014) 
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argues that in developing countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, Cambodia, 
Afghanistan, economic development has declined because actors engage in the illicit trade of 
natural resources. Therefore, trade profits instead of work as an incentive for violent conflicts94 
(Peterson, 2014, 4). Humphreys argues that grievances are associated with high dependence on 
the wealth extracted from natural resources95, where there is likely to be a high inequality, from 
the unjustly distributed natural resource wealth96. The warring groups are interested in creating 
the grievances to create prejudices among people and benefit from the extraction of financial 
benefits of natural resources. 
Natural resources are also an essential factor in the continuation of the war economy on a 
regional level. While valuable resources should contribute to economic development, they are 
also highly indicative of a probable conflict occurring, especially in places with ancient hatreds 
(Sherman, 2001, 1).  Therefore, natural resources can also lead to a country's economic 
destruction rather than economic development and state-building. That is, if warring forces had 
long been able to engage in illicit activities, consequently from the consolidation of a shadow 
economy, then they will have exploited the natural resources to the maximum. The longer the 
warring parties are in control of the natural resources, the harder is to rebuild political stability 
and economic recovery, after constant violence and destruction (Münkler, 2007, 2).  
After the trade in natural resources, the second most profitable activity is organized crime, 
which can be both national and transnational, made of structured organizations which conduct 
illegal activities. These organizations are motivated primarily by money and profit-seeking, in 
the benefit of criminals, and are usually associated with terrorist groups (Treverton et al., 2009: 
 
94 war economies, the valuable resources in these countries are used in the illegal trade, for instance of diamonds, 
timber, oil, and opium are the most lucrative industries which contribute for the warring parties to continue to 
engage in violent activity, insurrection, and therefore ongoing instability in zones of conflict. (Peterson,   
95. The existence of natural resources means that governments do not need to rely on citizens taxation and therefore 
respond to the demands of the people.   
96 The inequality that arises from the inequitable distribution of the wealth from a country's natural resources is 
another cause for forced migration in war economies. 
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12). Organized crime97 is an activity of shadow economy that works as a source of finance for 
the warring parties to engage in violence for political or ideological motives. Moreover, 
opposing parties are willing to cooperate in the illicit trade of goods and services to receive the 
financial benefit, and therefore, conflict becomes an ideal status quo. 
Human trafficking is estimated as the third most profitable organized crime which accounts 
to about 7 to 10 billion dollars in international monetary transactions after the trade in drugs 
and trade in arms (Koolaee, & Esfahani, 2014: 181). Especially after the 1990s in countries of 
the South of Caucasus, about 80% of the victims were women who were easily trafficked for 
slavery labor, housework or prostitution, with the latter accounting for about 70% of the cases. 
One of the leading causes of an increase in human trafficking is associated with ethnic conflict98   
Transnational networks are the fourth most lucrative source for the warring parties in a war 
economy. According to Studdard, networks "include familial, kinship, occupational, and 
diaspora groups." (Studdard, 2004: 6). In the absence of the state's security and sustenance and 
provision for societal necessities, family networks, and clan networks become the primary 
providers of the essential goods and services. Moreover, according to Kaldor, another form of 
assistance includes diaspora remittances, diaspora's direct assistance, assistance from foreign 
governments, and humanitarian assistance (Kaldor, 2012: 110). Diasporic funding is an 
external form of assistance and usually plays a critical factor in helping to raise revenue and 
support for the warring parties, which can either be voluntary or collected through coercion. 
The diaspora groups from outside can contribute to the funding of military resources of warring 
groups, through remittances from abroad since the failed states are not able to increase 
 
97 gangs are part of war economies types of actors who get involved with other actors such as rebel groups, state 
agencies, and democratically elected leaders (Peterson, 2014: 4). 
98. Besides ethnic conflict, other significant challenges that Koolaee & Esfahani find to intensify the phenomenon 
of human traffic is divided into five groups. "1) ethnic and territorial tensions and conflicts; 2) ineffective 
government and political instability; 3) social and economic underdevelopment; 4) transnational and organized 
crimes; and 5) foreign domination, especially the competition between regional and transnational powers; 
(Koolaee & Esfahani, 2014: 184). 
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production and do not collect taxes from citizens. Diaspora also provides material assistance 
with money and arms to the paramilitary groups. Moreover, according to Studdard, the 
diasporas can become almost a quasi-state, especially in the peripheral areas of weak and 
unsupervised territory by the state authority and feed into the regional economic complex 
(Studdard, 2004: 7). 
Lastly, war economy is also related to corruption, which is related to the abuse of power for 
personal gain, which is also a trigger of violence. Corruption creates insecurity and is a cause 
of inequality, which causes distrust in legitimate institutions of government. According to 
Hughes, "It is a major contributor to the social, cultural and economic decline of nation-states” 
(Hughes, 2010: 36).  Moreover, some of the related activities to corruption which contribute to 
war economy are tax evasion, currency violations, illegal drug dealings, illegal gambling, 
harboring criminals, homicide, or violence.  
Moreover, in the political economy approach, there is pollical violence, economic violence, 
violence for the provision of security to the perpetrators, and the psychological violence (Le 
Billon, 2000: 5). Besides the physical violence, the institutional violence is also in significant 
part serves to inflict damage on civilians.  
2.3.– Why violence persists and perpetuates in failed states 
Just as the state building process, the development of shadow economy is also a process takes 
long-term consolidation, yet when shadow economy is relatively flexible and easily adaptable 
to new conditions which makes it extremely hard to put an end. The shadow economies can 
exist in both the developed world countries and in the developing world. While there are some 
approaches for dealing with the criminal entrepreneurs within the local state territory, the 
regional dynamic is even harder to combat. According to Studdard, the “shadow networks tend 
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to exploit regional ties that may undermine strategies aimed at war transformation”99 (Studdard, 
2014: 12). In the report on the War Economies in a Regional Context: Overcoming the 
challenges of transformation, the issue of the regional networks between warlords point to 
the main challenges that have often been most neglected by the international system. The 
emphasis is put on the regional context because the regional networks are composed of different 
heads of transnational criminal networks, which are hard to track down.  
Neighboring states can also present interest in invading a failed state, through providing 
material support to rebel group for economic reasons. For instance, they also obtain valuable 
resources for trade and new smuggling routes. The regional conflict complexes are a variety of 
regional linkages among warring groups, which can be of four types of networks, military, 
economic, political and social, which create a web of connections that create alliances, among 
a broad type of actors. This web can pose threats to peacebuilding because of the fluidity of 
such networks which can alter their configuration among networks throughout the conflict, 
which, according to Kaysie Studdard, is a war transformation which requires: 
A comprehensive approach to war transformation, in this sense, must take care 
not to dismiss regional war economies as a monolithic set of illicit 
undesirables. The malleability, resourcefulness, and deep-seated survival 
instincts of these tenacious actors are demonstrated in Sierra Leone and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (Studdard, 2014: 14).  
In the context of the new war, a possible solution for peaceful ceasefire and negotiations and 
which could potentially put an end to violent conflict among ethnic groups is to bring each side 
to the negotiation table to discuss the interests of everyone involved.100 Therefore, it is essential 
that all key states and actors that represent civilians’ interest to be part of the peace negotiations, 
because conflicts are interconnected and should be a regional peace talk and to combine 
 
99 That is the region can have several failed states which imperil the states with relative peace. 
100 The case of the Kosovo representatives not being added in the participation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, 




national resources with cutting on external aid. Besides, in countries such as Africa and 
Afghanistan, where conflict goods such as diamonds and drugs are present in vast quantities, 
regional negotiations should reach the whole region. Besides, the International community 
approach to solving regional criminal network dynamics is the implementation of sanctions. 
However, these have proved to be ineffective because as pointed to pace with which these 
networks can readapt their routes of illegal activity trade is faster when compared to the non-
existent monitoring and weak enforcement of these sanctions. Be it the case of the imposition 
of sanctions as the diamond certificate system in West Africa, imposition of arms embargoes 
or imposition of sanctions on a state to pay compensation to any damage responsible for the 
neighbor state. 
The war economy is a local, regional, and global issue. In the regional context, the war 
economy encompasses various failed, where regional parallel economic relations of trade of 
illicit goods and services bring revenue for the warring groups across easily permeable borders, 
with barely any central state control. The economic exploitation in failed states occurs the more 
the economic power gets out the state control, that is where factors such as corruption are 
present, high taxes, expansion of the shadow networks and criminal social networks undermine 
state power to the point that it becomes hard to combat the borderland issues. The challenge 
lies in constant monitoring and offering good enough incentive for these warring groups to 
invest in state-building capacities. It proves to be difficult to effectively combat regional 
warlords through the destruction of illicit networks without central state authority. The danger 
of the spread of these networks to neighboring states becomes even more probable that the 
more punitive policies are imposed on the warring groups. 
In conclusion, the “new wars” political economy of war is difficult to end because there is a 
complex web involving social, regional, economic, political, and military networks. A common 
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issue in the “new wars” is that internal economic conflicts become not only local but also 
regional and transnational, tend to spread across borders into the neighboring states. Besides, 
the complexity of actors involved in criminal networks has proved to be highly malleable and 
resistant to new policy implementation by the international system. Therefore, the war 
economy trend of “new wars” dynamics allows for actors to sustain, perpetuate, and continue 
the conflict over decades. The warring actors broaden their illegal activities and promote 
insecurity within a larger territory. The spreading of conflict from one country affect the 
negatively the economic sphere, destroy social order, spur contestation for power and territory. 
Additionally, ethnic differences are a powerful resource for exploitation by illicit actors to keep 
economic power among other opponents in the dispute over the valuable natural resources 













Chapter III: Case study on Kosovo’s war economy 
Our most serious shortcoming – and here I 
refer to the entire international community – 
is our inability to prevent crises. The United 
Nations was born from war. Today we must 
be here for peace. ―  Antonio Guterres, 
2016 101 
The war between Kosovo and Serbia from 1992 to 2001 was chosen as the case study to analyze 
the political economy in Kosovo and the effects of the shadow economy in the armed conflict 
and the Kosovo War. The case study on Kosovo serves as an example of a war economy which 
has developed and consolidated over decades.  Shadow economy has been one of the leading 
factors in the Kosovo conflict. From the regional perspective, the countries in the Balkan region 
present with one of the largest shadow economies in Europe, which have developed well before 
the breakup of Yugoslavian Federation. In the case of Kosovo and its neighbor states, shadow 
economy is characterized by the emergence of mafia-style economy, the creation of parallel 
institutions and recurrence of violence. Such violence is usually caused by several factors of 
the shadow economy which are: a sudden outburst of violent civil war, ethnic collusion, elite 
corruption, weak government, state erosion, increased privatization, economic decline, 
political crisis, and social disorder. The focus of this chapter is to understand how the shadow 
economy leads to incentives in the perpetuation of violence, war and continued economic 
crisis.102 Kosovo has many aspects related to the emergence of shadow economy and wide 
criminal activity, the multiplicity of actors and interests at play. It becomes relevant to focus 
 
101 “Today in History: António Guterres sworn in as 9th UN Secretary General – United Nations.” Portuguese 
American Journal. (2016, December 14). Available at: https://portuguese-american-journal.com/today-in-history-
antonio-guterres-sworn-in-as-9th-un-secretary-general-united-nations/  (accessed 11/04/2019). 
102 According to Johan Galtung the concept of violence is “seen as the outcome of untransformed conflict.” 
Galtung, Johan & Webel, Charles, 2007: 14. Galtung puts emphasis on the relations between actors which can 
lead to peace if the conflict transformations happen on peaceful terms. However, violence happens when the 
conflict is negatively transformed or left untransformed. These transformations depend on the level of the 
compatibility of goals that antagonists pursue, hence the conflict and violence, which happen from an 
untransformed conflict (from a problematic relation), lead to the continuation of conflict (Galtung, Johan & 
Webel, Charles, 2007: 15).  
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on authors who provide special attention to the analysis of the economic aspects of the new 
war in Kosovo, besides the ethnic aspects of the conflict.  
3.1 – Ethnic conflict in Kosovo and the way to war 
The Balkans is a richly populated region by a diversity of ethnic and religious groups. 
Multiculturalism have existed for centuries among different nations in the region and were able 
to coexist in times of relative peace. However, diversity is often a fuel in disputes for territory, 
and therefore the Balkans are part of these characteristics. The contemporary warfare in this 
region becomes a representation of ethnic conflict and among different ethnic groups for 
political ambitions. Moreover, because the illicit activity in the former Yugoslavian region is 
intense the political ambitions can spread conflict and danger for the population as a whole and 
for the entire region.   
In Kosovo population consists of a majority in Albanian Kosovans and the lesser quantity in 
Serbian population. By 1991, Kosovo’s population accounted for approximately 2 million, 
from which around (82%) were Albanians; (11%) Serbs and Montenegrins, (3%) Gorans; (2%) 
Roma gypsies and (2%) other minorities (Thomas, N., Mikulan, K., & Pavlović, D., 2013: 31). 
Added to this, language and religion are two cultural aspects that set apart the Albanian from 
the Serbian people. 103 Ethnic tensions and border division in Kosovo date back to the 
occupation of the Ottoman Empire.  
The Kosovan population originated from the Malesija region and by the mid-eighteenth century 
began occupation of the Kosovo territory. The successful occupation by the Albanians resulted 
in the gradual decrease of the Serbian population after the Ottoman rule over Serbia (Gurr, 
 
103 The Serbian population are Orthodox Christians and speak the Serbian language. The Albanian Kosovans are, 
on the other hand, of a different religion and speak a  different language. Albanians are of Muslim religion and 
speak their specific language. (Bahador, 2007: 69). 
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2015: xi). The distribution of the Serbian population within Kosovo, has occupied the areas of 
the main city of Pristina and other areas mainly in the north of Kosovo near Serbian border.  
During the rule of Yugoslavian one party leadership of Josip Bros Tito, Kosovo was an 
autonomous province of the Republic of Serbia and was conceded additional rights by the 
Yugoslav Constitution of 1974.104 However, after the death of Josip Bros Tito, and the start of 
the dissolution of Yugoslavian Federation and the fragmentation of power brought back the 
power over the government in Kosovo and control over the Albanian representatives.  
The Serbian Federation was at that time under the leadership of President Slobodan 
Milosevic.105 The nationalist politics program by Milosevic was directed against Albanians, to 
take full control of Kosovo's territory through repression and diminish rights of the Albanian 
population such as the access to public institution and conducted massive imprisonment of 
Albanian in authoritative positions and politically engaged people in Kosovo.106 According to 
Sorensen, from 1990 to 1992, "the Serbian Parliament passed several hundred laws that,  in 
effect ended the autonomy of Kosovo in all spheres of life" (Sorensen, 2006: 335). Facing this 
situation, the Albanian Kosovans were convinced that by demanding independence from the 
Serbian Federation their rights and political life would be better without the Serbian oppressive 
rule and control over Kosovo.  
 
104 Even though Kosovo was not proclaimed as a Republic, it had the same power as the other Yugoslavian 
Republics because of the rights conceded to Kosovo in the Constitution of 1984. At the same time, Kosovo had 
the power to conduct their own internal and foreign affairs, on the other hand, the undefined power of Serbia 
provided grounds for a potential disintegration of the Serbian Republic. “UNHCR CDR Background Paper on 
Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Kosovo.” UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 1996, February 
1. Available at:  https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a640c.html (accessed 10/06/ 2019). 
105 Serb control over Kosovo became especially prominent with the leadership of the Serbian President Slobodan 
Milosevic, who was responsible for revoking the autonomous status of Kosovo in order to stop discrimination 
against the Serb population (Bahador, 2007: 69) 
106 PESNIC, Vesna. “Serbian Nationalism and the origins of the Yugoslav Crisis.” United States Institute of Peace. 
2015, January 27. Available at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/30963/1996_april_pwks8.pdf (accessed 5/5/2019). 
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However, demands for independence for Kosovo were ignored in the long run. Since all nations 
within Yugoslavia were hit by an economic crisis, the situation was also further worsened by 
this fact and the political consequences in Kosovo became the start of an escalation of a conflict 
to even worse consequences. 107  The Kosovo struggle only started to show its real character 
from the year 1995 which it is why this conflict was chosen as a case study for a deeper analysis 
of the causes of ongoing violence. Internal crisis can become devastating for a state if the 
political, economic and social spheres are in a situation of chaos. Therefore, consequences form 
this chaos arise to deal with this internal conflict in the contemporary setting of the post-Cold 
War period. Considering this setting it is important to focus on the development of the parallel 
state and life while addressing the internal conflict of a weak state. Internal crisis leads to illicit 
activities and easier involvement of the leaders with criminal networks and well as 
development of guerrilla like movements which use violent means to attain their objectives. 
Funding is a key to the persistence of conflict though the engagement in mafia style economies.  
In Kosovo, the creation of a parallel state was first pursued by the pro-Albanian leader, 
President Ibrahim Rugova of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). His policy was 
directed at achieving independence for the Kosovo which then remained as a province of the 
Republic of Serbia. 108 Remarkably, Rugova was convinced that a policy of non-violent 
approach would eventually lead the conflict in Kosovo to peaceful negotiations (Bahador, 




107 The Yugoslavian Federation’s economic situation during the 1970s resulted in a decrease in exports and in the 
1990s led to a rise in unemployment, defaults in salaries, poverty, and economic and social deterioration (Le 
Billon, 2000: 6). Also, the economic situation led to the emergence in criminal groups and parallel economy.  
108 The LDK was the key to the internationalization of the conflict by spreading their ideas to the diaspora circles, 
collected the 3% tax, built offices in the US and maintained a  strong relationship with the US-based diaspora and 
conducted moderate politics during the 1989-1998 (Koinova, 2012). 
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The slaughterhouse is not the only form of struggle. There is no mass 
humiliation in Kosovo. We are organized and are operating as a state. It is easy 
to take to the streets and to head towards suicide, but wisdom lies in eluding a 
catastrophe. (Independent, 2013 April 29).   
However, by the year of 1995, the independence for Kosovo was increasingly moving into the 
hands of a more radical group called the Kosovo Liberation Army. At the same time the conflict 
between Kosovo and Serbia, was getting out of hand while demands for independence by the 
Albanian Kosovars, were simply put aside and excluded from the Dayton Peace Agreement for 
Yugoslavia, but the U.N. General Assembly approved a resolution on the human rights 
violations.109 Considering this aspect, it is important to address the Dayton Peace Agreement 
of the 1995, marked a radical shift in the policy of Kosovo’s approach to the conflict against 
the Serbian Republic.  
3.2. The Dayton Peace Agreement 
The Dayton Peace Agreement was an intervention because it failed to prevent the conflict in 
Kosovo and the subsequent casualties and damages of the conflict. Consequently, tension 
between Kosovo and the Serbian Republic had a radical escalation associated with the 
negotiations after the Dayton Agreement in 1995. An initial approach to the conflict led by 
President Ibrahim Rugova, was the more peaceful approach which turned to a more radical and 
violent approach led by the Kosovo Liberation Army. The period of 1995 was the turning point 
because this new approach led to the escalation of conflict between Kosovo and Serbia. 
Moreover, the radical approach served to attract significant international attention to the 
struggles of the conflict which were mainly seen as an ethnic struggle with many human rights 
 
109 According to the Centre for documentation and Research, the “Dayton peace agreement for Yugoslavia, 
however, did not include the question of Kosovo because ´Clinton administration officials were reluctant to press 
the issue of Kosovo too hard´… In mid-December 1995, the Third Committee of the U.N. General Assembly 
approved a resolution on the human rights situation in Kosovo, strongly condemning the measures of 
discrimination against ethnic Albanians… (A/C.3/50/L43, 5 December 1995).” “UNHCR CDR Background 
Paper on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Kosovo.” UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 1996, 
February 1. Available at:  https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a640c.html [accessed 10/09/ 2019] 
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violations. By 1995, Kosovo reached a consolidated parallel life, which enabled to pursue 
political goals financed by parallel activity. Consequently, the conflict turned out to have 
gained incentives to a more radical approach, according to Peterson, "committed to using 
violence to achieve political ends" (Peterson, 2014: 73).  
The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) initiated in November 1995. It was intended to reach a 
ceasefire between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.110 The agreement was successful for ending the conflict that 
lasted four years in which 100,000 were killed and half of the Bosnia's' population displaced 
(Pasic, 2015). However, one of the mistakes of the DPA was that it encouraged a guerilla group 
in Kosovo to pursue a more violent approach to the conflict with Serbia. In order to make 
themselves heard, Kosovo’s independence was a goal pursued through violent means and so 
would play a role in capturing attention to the conflict against Serbian domination over 
Kosovo.111 The KLA movement was inclined to bring Kosovo’s struggle to international 
awareness.112 The aftermath of the DPA had this effect on Kosovo’s approach, and as Sorensen 
adds "if they wanted to receive attention from the international community, they had to produce 
war and a humanitarian crisis, as in Bosnia" (Sorensen, 2006: 342).  
Moreover, another mistake of the DPA negotiations tables was that there was no Albanian 
Kosovan representative to negotiate on the Kosovo struggle. The parties that signed the 
agreement included Alija Izetbegovic, Franjo Tduiman and Slobodan Milosevic, respectively 
 
110 “General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” (1995, November 21). Available at: 
https://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/dayton/52577.htm (accessed 10/06/2019). 
111 The armed clashed between the KLA against the Serbian authorities started during the 1996, and in 1998, 
clashes transformed into guerilla warfare, which served to attract attention to the conflict which involved killing 
of Serbian authorities in Drenica region (Bahador, 2007 :70). 
112 In the “new wars” the aspect of the new forms of communications is key in bringing awareness to violent 
conflict. Communications allow for rapid propagation of images and video of the incidents. In this case, the 
objective of a radical group is to reveal the conflict as a cause of exclusive politics. Therefore, with the media 
coverage, the actors involved in the violent conflict have the power to mobilize support around them by 
documenting atrocities and bringing them to international awareness. As Kaldor argues, “communications are 
increasingly a tool of war, it makes it easier to spread fear and panic” ( Kaldor, 2012: 205). 
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by the representatives of the Republic of Bosnia, the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of 
Serbia. While Kosovo's struggle was left unattended by the UNO after the Dayton Agreement, 
President Milosevic felt confident to "pursue a policy of ethnic cleansing and repression in 
Kosovo" (Sorensen, 2014: 73). As the conflict proceeded in the following years, violent 
retaliations became common and have affected the opinions of the international public 
concerning military intervention in Kosovo. Therefore, the analysis of the Kosovo conflict 
focusses on the criminal activities of a mafia-style economy and the actors which play a role 
in Kosovo’s war economy. 
3.3. The flows and complexity of actors in Kosovo 
To better understand the dynamics of the war economy in Kosovo, we must pay attention to 
the complexity of actors and interests at play. In chapter I, Kaldor explains the factors attributed 
to the persistence of violence in the context of “new wars”. The actors in the contemporary 
wars consist of both internal and external actors. When the number and the range of actors 
involved increase in a conflict such as the Kosovo’s case, the harder it is to put end to violence. 
In the study of the “new wars”, Mary Kaldor put emphasizes on this aspect because the 
complexity of actors become a significant issue in conflicts. There is resistance against ending 
the conflict because so many interests coexist at the same time.  
According to Peterson, the war economy in Kosovo is characterized by a complexity of 
interests. In the following graphic Peterson relates actors to their economic motivations and 
activities related to Kosovo’s war economy. Peterson finds that international organizations such 
as NATO/UN and the western governments were engaged and willing to provide help in the 
war in Kosovo because it allowed them to keep protection over the peacekeeping investments 
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in the region.113  For instance, the financial and military gains in the Balkan region have already 
taken place in the case of the deployment of the troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the 
Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995 in order to be able to put end to violent situation between the 
newly created entities.114 Therefore, with the case of  Kosovo,115 the international organizations 
looked forward to keep protection over the financial and military gains from the given 
protection to the Balkan region. According to Patterson, the logic of protection is that Kosovo’s 
region is no exception, because as studied in the chapter II, a destabilized area can affect the 
rest because the conflict tends to spread across borders.  
Besides, Western governments and MNC’s, private military or security companies are 
economically motivated in the region because these actors want to ensure the safety of the route 
of oil through the Caspian sea (Peterson, 2014: 73). At the same time, private security actors, 
provide with the arms sales, military/security contracts. Therefore, Private Military Security 
Companies (PMSCs) also play an increasingly influential role the duration of conflicts.116 
Privatized Military Industry is known to provide training and arms to KLA group in Kosovo 
and is known to have contributed to an escalation of the conflict in Kosovo.117 However, the 
PMSC’s contributed to a significant turn of events for Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo, as the 
 
113 According to Hentges & Coicaud, J, the “costs of peacekeeping operations throughout the 1990s reached a 
total of $19.9 billion…As, such the budget of peacekeeping operations during the 1990s far exceeded the regular 
budget of the United Nations, which did not surpass $13.7 billion between 1991 and 2000.” (Hentges, H., & 
Coicaud, J. (2002). 
114 After the important Dayton Peace Agreement, the investments meant to stopping the armed forces from clashes 
and divide territory between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Respublika Srpska. “Security thought 
Partnership: Peace-support operations” NATO On-line library, 2006, Feb. 02. Available at: 
https://www.nato.int/docu/sec-partnership/html_en/nato_secur06.html 
115 The UN peacekeeping mission in Kosovo was conducted in 1999. One of the main achievements of this 
operation according to Hentges, H., & Coicaud, J, is that the: UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Kosovo 
Force (KFOR) deserve credit for demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and preventing civil war 
between supporters of the KLA and Ibrahim Rugova’s League of Democrats of Kosovo (LDK), which threatened 
to break out in the chaotic and violent conditions of post-war Kosovo (Hentges, H., & Coicaud, J.,2002: 363).   
116 PMSC’s conduct the business of military provision in arms, military and security contracts on favorable terms. 
The military industry is known to be the most profiting industry in such conflicts. 
117 The KLA armed group received Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) training.  This training 
was conducted under the command of General Agim Ceku, who was former General of the Croatian army. He 
also planned a major ethnic cleansing of Croatian Serbs Carter, G. (2018, June 29). “The Role of MPRI and the 




military training  provision by these private security companies also established a balance of 
power against the Serbian Republic. (Mohlin, 2014: 25).  
Moreover, the northern area of Kosovo, the Serbia, and Kosovo have disputed control over, 
according to Peterson "the largest mineral deposit in the region including zinc, lignite, and 
coal" (Peterson, 2014: 74). The Trepca mineral which contains about 40 mines and factories 
today deposit has also been the reason for a dispute. It is situated at the north of Kosovo near 
the border with Serbia. After Tito’s death, the authority in Belgrade monopolized the exports 
of the production of minerals and took away an important source of economic development 
from Albanian Kosovan. Once the Serbian authorities took control over the mineral deposit, 
Albanian Kosovar workers were expelled, creating vast unemployment118 
The war economy was also exacerbated by the implementation of sanctions directed against 
the Yugoslavian Federation.119 In order to mitigate the conflict, international sanctions were 
imposed to prevent from armed violent conflict. The imposition of arms embargo was meant 
to give an incentive for all sides to choose to negotiate on peaceful terms. However, these 
sanctions also caused unemployment, extreme inflation, which consequently, made essential 
services unaffordable for most of the population.120 Serbian side was considered as the main 
culprit for starting the conflict because Serbia opposed to the creation of separate identities in 
the FRY. That, is the Serbian minorities within Yugoslavia was composed mostly by Serbian 
ethnic groups, which accounted according to the Thomas S. Szayna, to about 36,30%, while in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina the Serbian population was about 32,02% in comparison to the Muslim 
 
118 “Trepca: Making Sense of the Labyrinth.” International Crisis Group (ICG), 1999 November, 26. Available 
at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6de8.html (accessed 19/05/2019).   
119 GARFIELD, R. (2003). “Sanctions and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: assessing impacts and drawing 
lessons.” HPN. Available at: https://odihpn.org/magazine/sanctions-and-the-federal-republic-of-yugoslavia-
assessing-impacts-and-drawing-lessons/ (accessed 10/07/2019). 
120 According to Peterson “sanctions, and the effect they had on the availability of goods, led to inflation of 1000 
by 1993" (Peterson, 2014: 74).   
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population of about 39,52%.121 The considerable number of Serbian populations everywhere 
in Yugoslavia, constituted a resistance force against the forming of the new identities by 
undergoing the process to independence. As the Serbian nationalism grew the more ethnic 
cleansing became a method of violence against innocent people. Therefore, harsh sanctions 
were imposed on the Serbs, according to Hejsek: 
Economic sanctions of May 1992, which UN Security Council a year later 
made stricter and expanded to the territory controlled by Serbs in Croatia 
and Bosnia, prohibited total export from the FRY and de facto prevent 
total imports to the FRY together with the transit of good through the 
territory of Serbia and Montenegro (Hejsek, 2012: 3).  
 
The table below represents the economic motivations of different actors discussed above.  
 
 Source: Peterson, 2014: 76  
 
121 Additionally, the other most populated regions in Yugoslavia by the Serbian minority, were in Serbia’s two 
autonomous provinces of Kosovo (13,22%) and Vojvodina (54,42); In Croatia (11,55%), with Bosnia-
Herzegovina  with the biggest percentage and therefore, ethnic conflict broke into a violent war which ended in 
the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. (Szayna, Thomas, S. 2000). 
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Considering that the situation within the Federation of Yugoslavia was on the verge of war, 
sanctions, economic crisis, and precarious conditions, a commercial war economy started to 
develop, where political groups and rebel groups started to amass wealth for private benefit. 
For instance, KLA received the called Homeland is Calling fund to support KLA activity. KLA 
maintained relations with organized crime groups from which drug smuggling, extortion and 
protection rackets and human smuggling supported armed uprisings. For many, smuggling was 
a way of  earning money to survive. While many people joined the KLA movement to fight for 
Kosovo's independence, the KLA movement also became a way of life and survival. (Peterson, 
2014: 76). Additionally, the funding for the Homeland is Calling fund came from a collection 
of 3% tax from Albanian diaspora.122  
 
Source: graphic elaborated by me 
 
122 The 3 % tax was created by the Kosovo government in exile, with the funds coming mainly from Western 
Europe and North America. The 3% tax was requested from Kosovans living abroad, to contribute from their 
incomes into the fund called Homeland is calling, which was established in 1998-1999 to fund the KLA. DEMI, 
Argon. 2018, April 19. “How to build a parallel state”. Prishtina Insight. Available at: 
https://prishtinainsight.com/build-parallel-state-mag/ (accessed 4/05/ 2019).  
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In Kosovo and Serbia, as well as in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the emergence of the non-
state armed actors, such as rebel groups, criminal networks, warlords and militias were 
involved in smuggling activities, both as a way of survival and to conduct armed resistance. 
Kosovo was the least developed area and therefore, it was highly dependent of the subsistence 
agriculture, diaspora support and the grey economy. Besides it is often the case of the non-state 
actors working as a supporting tool for the state actors. These dynamics between the flows of 
the actors in the Kosovo war economy are represented in the graphic in the previous page: 
From the graphic above, we can see that in Kosovo there are both, the State Actors situated on 
the left and the Non-state Actors situated on the right. The State Actors are divided in the five 
boxes. The first part is the International Organizations + the Western Governments box 
showing the main activities and motivation involving the Kosovo’s conflict, explained before 
according to Jenny Patterson from the article Building a Peace Economy. The second box 
represents the Republic of Albania and its motivations. For instance, as it will be explained 
later, its intentions for including Kosovo into the formation of a “Greater Albania”. Also, 
another important point is that the burring of borders between Kosovo and Albania made 
criminal activities and arms trade easy for the KLA. The third box represents the Serbian 
Officials, seen as the main aggressors in Kosovo and as a cause for economic 
underdevelopment in Kosovo (such as the economic hyperinflation and disputes over the 
region’s natural resource mines). Lastly, on the left side, the fifth box represents the other 
regional countries such as Macedonia123, Romania124 and Bulgaria, including Albania, who 
engaged in and facilitated the criminal activities related to Kosovo.  
 
123 Macedonia’s economy was limited to the exports to Serbia after the war with Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
and so illegal arms trade was the activity with involvement of state ministers (Hajdinjak, 2002: 17).  
124 In Romania, the economic decline was attributed to the Ceausescu’s authoritarianism, also created conditions 
for the development of a black market, in which cigarettes, drugs, arms were practiced beyond borders, especially 
the export in arms across Yugoslavia, by the secret police forces called Securitate (Hajdinjak, 2002: 20).  
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However, there is a distinction from the state actors and the non-state actors, and the later are 
equally important in the understanding of the Kosovo conflict. As we have seen, the above 
actors are State Actors because they are defined state entities, which means they are nation-
state actors that contain the monopoly of violence and uphold basic functions such as 
maintaining security services for its national protection of the territory and for protecting its 
national interests (Grassiani & Ben-Ari, 2011: 7). On the contrary, Non-State Actors (NSA’s), 
are separate from the state entities. However, their organization is political in nature and they 
have greatly affected the state’s internal affairs post-Cold War period. Intrastate conflicts 
within a weakened state results out of the non-state actors “bargaining between antagonists” 
(Pearlman & Cunningham, 2012: 3). Non-state Actors are also dominant in the conflict because 
they have affected the destiny and the duration of the conflict in Kosovo. According to the 
graphic, on the right side, the Non-state actors can be identified in warlords (Hatchim Thaci), 
illegitimate armed groups (KLA), private security companies (Private Military Industries), 
criminal networks, as well as, diasporas. For instance, the rebel groups (KLA) received its 
support from various non-state actors such as from the Private Military Industry provided with 
MPRI training under the General Ceku for the warlord, Hachim Thaci.125 On the other hand, 
the criminal networks provided with money, armed men and weapons to KLA in addition to 
the financial help and support from the diaspora situated in the Western countries. As Kaldor 
and Munkler argue, the emergence of NSAs is related to the globalization process, in which, 
the free flow of people and goods, the erosion of the state and blurred borders, open more 
opportunities in the development of large shadow economies. 
 
125 Hashim Thaci, was born in the Drenica valley, in the west of Pristina where KLA group was formed,  is an 
influential figure in politics, also a leader of the KLA. He was the Prime-Minister in Kosovo (2008-14) and is 
currently the President of Kosovo since 2016. He is allegedly considered to have been involved in organized 
crime. ANDREJEVICH, Milan. “Hashim Thaçi, President of Kosovo.” Encyclopedia Britannica.  2019, June 21. 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hashim-Thaci (retrieved on 11/05/2019).  
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3.4. The causes and development of the shadow economy in Serbia and Kosovo 
In the 1990s, there was an active merging between the political elite and organized crime and 
grey economy had already spread to the least developed areas previously to the Yugoslavian 
War.126 The parallel economy was created as an alternative system and offer alternative 
protection against the deteriorating rule of law. From the parallel system, the political elites 
could extract revenues to pursue political activities. Moreover, as we seen in the last chapter, a 
parallel economy can survive if it receives funding from illegal activities thought the regional 
and transnational networks. Transnational networks are known to be complex and extremely 
flexible in their reconfiguration of criminal channels and for their difficult to identify the 
leaders of these networks. According to Sorensen, the phenomenon of the illiberal economy 
has often been ignored when analyzing such conflicts. Therefore, the aspect of the shadow 
economy is important to analyze, because as Sorensen argues:   
 the considerable consolidation of illiberal economies in Serbia and Kosovo 
(as elsewhere in the post-Yugoslavian space) have been intimately connected 
to politics, political violence and conflict in the region and produced a 
transformation of wealth and resources. (Sorensen, 2006: 317).  
Circumstances in Serbia were marked by war, sanctions, economic crisis, high hyperinflation, 
refugee crisis and the authoritarianism of Slobodan Milosevic. Besides, another indication of 
being a weak state is the collapse of the legal system and criminalization of economy (Sorensen, 
2006: 329). 127 As we have seen, Kaldor also focuses on the problem of a failing state as source 
for both violent conflict and the development of illegal economic networks. Therefore, in the 
Republic of Serbia met all the conditions of a weak state in a period of economic decline. 
 
126 Grey economy is the type of economy that includes both informal and formal activities, which is often 
practiced when there is "inadequate means of legal enforcement" (Krasniqi &Topxhiu, 2012: 7).  
127 According to Sorensen " Serbian society in the 1990s, with hyperinflation, war and sanction, experienced a  
large-scale breakdown of the legal system in which the state led the way, and the economy was severely 
criminalized." (Sörensen, 2006: 328). 
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The economic crisis was exacerbated by sanctions because they contributed to the decline of 
the Serbian economy and from this point there was an especially rapid increase in the grey 
economy and black market. According to Michael Pugh, the sanctions gave way to organized 
crime which "opened up new opportunities and incentive structures for ruthless, predatory and 
socially destabilizing mafia networks and corrupt rentiers to gain from clientelism" (Pugh, 
2006: 120). Moreover, the economic crisis spread affected Kosovo during 1993 to 1999s. 
Therefore, it became increasingly evident that the trade of illegal goods and services were an 
option in order to survive throughout this period. As a result, during the 1990s, the economic 
crisis in Serbia forced people to choose either engage in grey and the black sector or to emigrate 
to another country (Sorensen, 2006: 331). Any immigrant that came to Serbia would also serve 
as a source of cheap labor inside Serbia. 128 
Considering these consequences, there was a need for the creation of a parallel economy. 
According to Sorensen, around 270, 000 new private enterprises were registered under 
Milosevic’s government. This new parallel economic, social, legal institutions created new 
opportunities for the new group of emergent entrepreneurs.129 The several groups engaged in 
the illicit activity in Serbia, which is characterized as a mixture of a grey and black economy. 
130 Illicit activities were often under direct state control and its top officials. The financing from 
the revenue of the trans-border trade did not go directly to the federal government. Instead, 
revenue was controlled by the Head of Customs and sent to the State Security Police. 
 
128 According to Sorensen, Serbia “received an influx of between 600,000 and 1,000,000 refugees from Bosnia, 
Croatia and Kosovo, which due to their uncertain situation provided a further recruiting base for cheap labor in 
the black-market sector.” (Sorensen, 2006: 330).  
129 During the 1990s, Serbia was considered as a kleptocracy, in which a small percentage of the population grew 
very rich (1-2%) in contrast to the majority which remained very poor and was reliant on the grey and black 
economic activities. (Sorensen, 2006 :322). In this period, a new middle class of private entrepreneurs was 
emerging out of the opportunities created from war and sanctions and was able to accumulate capital out of illegal 
channels. According to Miladen Lazic, these emergent entrepreneurs were the ruling group of Serbia, under 
Slobodan Milosevic’s rule, that were able to control the most important economic resources (Lazic, 2015: 535). 
According to Lazic these new economic elite was divided in three subgroups: “members of the nomenklatura, 
´wartime entrepreneurs´, and people from middle strata” (Lazic, 2015: 540).  




The State Security Police worked in connection with the command of President Slobodan 
Milosevic, to finance armed activities against Kosovo. For instance, the revenues were 
connected to the financing of select units, known as the "Red Beret", who were provided with 
the best equipment. 131 These specialized units were formed by criminals, who conducted 
operations such as ethnic cleansing in Kosovo (Sorensen, 2006: 329). Beside ethnic cleansing, 
there was large-scale looting of the house property from the Albanian Kosovans and even from 
the Serbian people in Kosovo. According to Sorensen, these operations were “undertaken by 
paramilitary groups to supply themselves and their patrons with resources” (Sorensen, 2006: 
329).   
3.4.1. Independence Claims  
The 1990s was a period characterized by high unemployment to about 20%, with 60% of the 
Yugoslav population living at below poverty line (Pugh, 2006: 118). The cause for inflation 
was the inadequate economic policy approach in time of crisis, which was based on a system 
of one-party political system, a nonmarket economic system and discretionary economic 
policy. Yugoslavia’s external debt led to hyperinflation throughout the 70s and 80s, and by 
1991, the external debt reached about $20 billion. According to Predrag Rajsic:   
Despite the pumping of huge amounts of foreign funds into the country, 
household income declined sharply in the second half of the 1970s. The annual 
inflation rate was measured by two-digit numbers, and a few years before 
Tito’s death, it accelerated and reached 40 percent per year (Rajsic, 2014).  
Yugoslavian economic situation was already showing signs of no developments in the future, 
leaving the Republics in a continued struggle. Inflation further grew worse after Milosevic’s 
Parliament secretly ordering the Serbian National Bank to issue $1.4 billion in credits, which 
 
131 These select units were led by Milorad Ulemik-Lukovic. The ´Frenki's Boy´, or ´Red Berets´ were an army 
group in Kosovo.  
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destroyed the economy in the then Yugoslavian Federation (Hanke, 1999). Also, during the 
1990s, economic crisis and the repression from the Serbian regime over Kosovo led to the 
development of a parallel system which have similarly worked as a survival strategy and 
provided funding for the armed groups against Serbia. In Kosovo, the GDP decreased to 50% 
until 1994. One of the main consequences of the decrease in the GDP is that the increase in the 
provision of necessities to people are not satisfied and there are no economic conditions that 
could promote a strong state, stability, economic and financial flows of the trade in the formal 
economy. A high unemployment is a strong indicator of issues in weak states, where there are 
low salaries and incentives to join the shadow economy. In addition, these worsening 
conditions were accompanied by the rule of the President Slobodan Milosevic, who used 
violent means to suppress the Albanian majority in Kosovo (Bahador, 2007:80 xxi). According 
to Peterson, parallel political economy in Kosovo was caused by two key triggers: the decisions 
taken by the Serbian Parliament and the “increase of the Serbian state control over Kosovo” 
(Peterson, 2014: 71). Milosevic stripped Kosovo of its autonomous rights in 1987 to have more 
control over Kosovo.  
However, at that time Kosovo’s majority were Albanians, while Serbs were a minority. 
Milosevic wanted to undergo ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, and the violations against the Serbian 
minority in Kosovo was considered as a pretext used by Milosevic to deny Kosovo’s autonomy. 
During the 1990s, the representatives of the Provincial Assembly demanded for Kosovo 
Independence.132 In 1991 there was a referendum for independence and presidential elections 
in 1992. However, in these elections the Serbian government sent an order to arrest the elected 
Albanian leaders for the attempt to create a ´Republic´ in Kosovo.  
 
132 In the aftermath of the elections and the independence claims, the Serbian authorities arrested LDK members.  
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Nevertheless, Kosovo's Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova was responsible for creating an 
"alternative political structure and government" which could be built outside the Serbian polity. 
(Sorensen: 2006, 334). Rugova was a dedicated to the Albanian studies ,which had a “focus on 
the growing ethnic Albanian opposition to Serbian rule” (Prentice, 2006). His political program 
was uncontested and because other Kosovar political parties did not have a strong national 
program as LDK. Therefore, LDK became a hegemonic party which supported a parallel 
society for Albanians.133 Only later, after the1995, did the KLA challenge LDK leadership, and 
put forward an alternative strategy. According to the article “Unifying the Kosovar Factions: 
The Way Forward”: “Kosovo Albanians could no longer continue to support Rugova's stance 
and that a more active resistance to the situation was needed” (International Crisis Group, 
1999, Mar 12).134 
However, Independence claims for Kosovo Albanians started during the period when the 
political party’s leader Ibrahim Rugova, became the president of the self-declared “Republic 
of Kosovo”. Since its status was not recognized, Kosovo became a parallel state, a project of 
funding and support for the Albanian institutions in Kosovo, which was possible under the 
leadership of the LDK party. According to the article “Yugoslavia: Information on the 
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK).”: 
The LDK obtained 76.44 per cent of the vote, which translated into 96 seats in 
the 140-seat assembly. Fourteen seats reserved Kosovo's ethnic Serbian 
minority remained empty as a result of their boycott of the vote” (Canada: 
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 1994, May 1). 135 
The parallel system meant that underground institutions were created and separated from state 
institutions, which existed in Kosovo before the 1990s (Sorensen: 2006, 334). For society to 
 
133 LDK promoted an ethnic society´, rather than ́ civil society´ (Sorensen, 2006: 333). The parallel society focused 
on creating Albanian institutions in Kosovo.  
134 Vide: https://reliefweb.int/report/albania/unifying-kosovar-factions-way-forward 
135 Vide: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aad498.html (accessed 17/05/2019).  
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survive and function, Kosovo parallel economy and society were dependent on international 
and transnational networks. LDK was responsible for the creation of the parallel institutions 
which were funded through the creation of the Central Council for Financing in Kosovo 
(KQFK) in 1992. In addition, a 3% tax came from the diaspora, from which, about 111,5 
million were gathered in Duetsche mark. (Demi, 2018 April 19). Therefore, it was possible to 
develop, according to Sorensen "complete or partial networks of social, political, union, 
healthcare, sports, media, and cultural associations" (Sorensen, 2006: 335).136 Besides, the 
parallel structures were a form of protection for the Albanians in Kosovo, as life conditions 
worsened in all sectors of society (i.e. poor medical assistance and poor supply of 
pharmaceutical supplies), the population was reliant 20% on humanitarian aid as another 20% 
fled Kosovo (Sorensen, 2006: 336).  
According to Kaldor (2014), the significant factors that played a critical role in the case of 
Kosovo Albanians to financing of the parallel economy, was the diaspora.137 The Albanian 
Kosovan diaspora was mainly localized in Germany and Switzerland (Kaldor, 2014: 89). Also, 
according to Sorensen, the diaspora “played a crucial role in lobbying for the Albanian ´cause´, 
as well as in the financing of political parties, organizations and parallel institutions” (Sorensen, 
2006: 339). For instance, finance would then come from the creation of a ´state treasury´ for 
the Republic of  Kosovo, established in Switzerland", where large Albanian group sent money 
back to their families (Sorensen, 2006: 334). Diaspora solidary money was an essential source 
of income for the families that lived in Kosovo. These remittances came mainly from Western 
Europe and the USA, but also from Croatia and Macedonia and Kosovo itself138, as well as for 
 
136 They also had to create a parallel University for the students, which were expelled from the University of 
Pristina by the Serbs. Albanian Kosovars had to create networks of primary and secondary schools as well. 
137 The Albanian diaspora was primarily distributed in Western countries (Switzerland between 30, 000 - 100,000; 
Germany with more than 100,000; USA between 250,000 – 500,000) (Sorensen: 2006, 339). 
138 The parallel institutions were financed by a system through a parallel tax system which collected 3% of income 
tax from Albanians working abroad and in Kosovo, also from Albanians in Macedonia. The collection of taxes 
was entirely voluntary, yet pressure was used to pay these taxes with personal visits to collect the taxes. 
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Albanian humanitarian organizations.139 Later, the diaspora helped finance the KLA, whose 
remittances alone amounted to around $163 million, which came mainly from the diaspora 
living in North America and Western Europe (Peterson, 2014, 77). Besides diaspora transfers, 
the smuggling of drugs, according to Sorensen constituted “the most important pillar in 
financing the parallel institutions in Kosovo through the 1990s” (Sorensen, 2006: 336).140  
Paradoxical Serbian – Albanian pax mafiosa (Stratazzi, 2006: 145)  
Zeljko Ražnatović (Arkan 
& Darko Asanin) (Serbian 




(member of the Karadzic 
government in Rep. Serbia)  
& 
Enver Hajin 
(Albanian criminal boss 
operating around the Skhoder 
lake)  
• The flux of heroin from Plovnic (Bulgaria) society 
was controlled by an Albanese mafia boss (Nazim 
Delegu) → known to have expanded former 
Yugoslavian territories (Stratazzi, 2006: 146). While 
the Serbian boss (Arkan) schemed the “protection of 
the route through Bulgaria, Serbia, Budapest, and 
Bratislava” (Pught, 2006: 1118).  
 
• The evidence according to Stratazzi is that “In 
December 1996, at the border post of Dimitrovgrad-
Gradina, the Yugoslav police intercepted 365 
kilograms of heroin on board a truck carrying green 
peppers from Plovdiv.” Stratazzi, 2006:145).  
 
• Lake Skholder: two hundred boats (fuel smuggling) 
during the 1993-1994, worth $1 million/day;  
 
 
Italian ‘Ndrangheta’ Mafia 
& 
 
Kosovar Mafia  
(emerged between  
1995-1998) 
 
• Heroin trade controlled by the so-called 15 Families, 
territorially divided clans; who were part of KLA.  
• Kosovo Albanians asserted control of the heroin 
traffic 
• Kosovo was linked to the Adriatic sea ports & became 
the center of the transport of the heroin traffic from 
Turkey;  
• seventy percent of heroin was sold to Germany, 
Austria, Switzerland and Check Rep.  
• The profits from the heroin trade were about $250 
million (Peterson, 2014: 76). 
Table elaborated by me based on (Stratazzi 2006: 145), (Peterson, 2014: 76) and (Pugh, 2006: 76). 
 
139 The Albanian structure relied on community solidarity and diaspora remittance. According to Sorensen "at 
least 30% of Kosovo Albanians depended on direct support from their relatives abroad" (Sorensen: 2006, 336).   
140 Also, financial gains obtained from different forms of smuggling was transferred as diaspora remittances into 
Kosovo. (Sorensen, 2006: 336). 
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The table above portrays the individuals and their criminal organizations and relations to the 
criminal activities within Kosovo and how funding was obtained to help support the rebel 
group, KLA. As we have seen before, the development of a parallel system, promoted the 
emergence of a pax mafiosa. The pax mafiosa was a reciprocal relation among three criminals 
between “Zeljko Ražnatović (Arkan) in Serbia; Momcilo Mandić, a member of the Karadižić 
government in Republika šrpska; and Enver Hajin of the Albania Secret Police” (Pugh, 2006: 
118). According to Edgardo Rotman, in the Journal on the “Globalization of Criminal 
Violence” the concept of pax mafiosa, which is theorized by Claire Sterling, means that 
organized crime is a multilateral agreement between the crime syndicates from all around the 
world, and that now they constitute a new criminal class that have, at least, spread on a 
transnational level (Rotman, 2000: 17). According to Stratazzi, there was a pax mafiosa in 
Kosovo, where a cooperation among the Albanian mafia bosses and the Serbian mafia bosses 
was discovered through the apprehension of the heroin trade, such as the case mentioned by 
Francesco Stratazzi, in December of 1996. Besides this cooperation, the Albanian Kosovars 
were able to control heroin traffic by establishing networks with Italian ‘Ndrangheta’ Mafia, 
allowing to make profit in approximately $250 million in the trade of drugs sold to western 
European countries.  
In addition, because of the consolidation of illicit activity that provided with funding and 
enough capabilities, the KLA armed group was able to keep some control over Pristina from 
the Serbian armed forces. However, provocation from both sides of the conflict developed in a 
violent conflict during 1998-1999. For instance, after the collapse in 1990s of the Albanian 
state, Tirana’s central government lost control over borders and it became easier for Albanians 
in Kosovo to get guns and ammunition into Kosovo for a cheap price141. Therefore, it is argued 
 
141 According to Peterson “unlimited supply of cheap weapons became readily available to emerging armed groups 
in Kosovo” (Peterson, 2014: 73). 
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that KLA was at the same time a militant movement for the Kosovo independence against 
Serbian control. However, the emergence of the movement also coincided with the increase in 
criminal networks, smuggling, trafficking of drugs, weapon, and humans.142 The provision of 
cheap ammunition and weapons was only part of the Albanian contribution to the Kosovo 
armed group. There was in fact an active mafia networks among Kosovo, Serbia, Albania and 
Macedonia.  
3.4.2. The role of the Albanian Mafia 
The parallel economy also relies on the transnational networks, which operate beyond Kosovo 
borders, and money from criminal activities circulated among different regions of "Albanian 
lands” (Albania proper, Kosovo, Macedonia.) (Sorensen, 2006: 338). Smuggling and organized 
crime were the most profitable activity, and these included the smuggling of drugs. According 
to the following passage: 
The Albanian Mafia operates in all fields of smuggling, including arms, human 
trafficking, cigarette smuggling,  and narcotics (heroin, cocaine, synthetic 
drugs, and cannabis). Some estimates suggest that the value of this is about 
US$2 billion per year (Sorensen, 2006: 337). 
The Albanian criminal networks were most active in Europe and the  USA. Criminal activities 
which brought the most financial profit were drugs and arms trade. Albanian mafia had access 
too cheap arms and explosives and traded these to the Italian mafia. The trade of small arms 
proved to be a profitable business, as well as human trafficking and prostitution worth in 
millions of euros per annum in revenues. Heroin trade expanded during the 1990s beyond 
Central Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan,  and Turkey). The trade found its way into Western 
Europe via Turkey route, or through northern, southern routes, including the Balkan region. 
 
142 The income from drug and goods trafficking and relations with Italian mafia helped fund an insurgency by 
KLA, and under the leadership of Hashim Thaci, KLA became a black-market economy structure which became 
mixed with the parallel system of Ibrahim Rugova (Pugh, 2006: 118). 
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The Albanian Kosovar, in collaboration with the Italian mafia controlled the drug traffic, which 
helped to finance insurgency. The profits from the heroin trade were about $250 million 
(Peterson, 2014: 76). The Albanian mafia was in control of a "large part of the heroin trade in 
Western Europe", to the extent that: 
By the  late 1990,s it was estimated that they controlled some 70% of the 
markets in Italy, Germany, Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Switzerland 
and Belgium and about 80% of the Scandinavian market (Sorensen, 2006: 
337). 
 
Furthermore, according to Sorensen, the KLA movement “controlled much of the heroin trade 
and thus financed the organization through, among other things, the drugs trade and smuggling” 
(Sorensen, 2006: 34). The role of the existing clans in Kosovo was necessary for this part 
because these clans, especially in the poorest, the Drenica region, controlled the trade of illicit 
activities. For example, as Sorensen (2006) finds:  
A report by the ‘US Senate Republican Policy Committee’ (RPC) from 1999 
refers to newspaper articles which state that about half of the funding for the 
KLA came from drug trafficking and that around 900,000,000 German Marks 
(of which half was drug-related) had reached Kosovo since the beginning of 
the guerrilla campaign. (Sorensen: 2006, 341).  
 
However, KLA was not only intending to bring to life the idea of the Albanian nationalist 
movement to unite all Albanians and territories into a ´Greater Albania´ (large parts of 
Macedonia, south Serbia, part of Montenegro and parts of Greece) (Sorensen: 2006, 341). The 
following map illustrates the idea of a Greater Albania and its borders:143 
 





Additionally, Francesco Stratazzi (2006), analyses the conflict in Kosovo, through the 
dynamics of the criminal networks existing in neighboring countries affected Kosovo's future 
developments in the conflict. That is, according to Stratazzi, Kosovo "grew into a crossroad for 
all sorts of trades that were able to engender large profits."144 (Stratazzi, 2006: 145).  
As Stratazzi analyses, the conflict in Kosovo until 1997 was deceptively peaceful in the way 
that it spurred only later violent incidents. The International sanctions were a contributing 
factor to the increase in the illicit activities. Serbian, Albanian, Montenegrin and Kosovar 
territories became an area of illegal trade in illicit drugs and oil, and there was a development 
in criminal organizations that were able to provide with a broad range of commodities. Tirana 
was the center of the illicit activity. According to Stratazzi, Tirana, the city of Albania was 
“explosive admixture of politics, private interests, and illicit transactions was being prepared" 
(Stratazzi, 2006:145). Additionally, in Kosovo, the Albanian Kosovars enjoyed three times 
higher than the average salary when compared to the Serbian Kosovars in Pristina, because of 
the existence of a dense network of private activities. However, there was a period when leaders 
 
144 However, intense criminal activity is associated with the Albanian state project of building a parallel system: 
state, economy, and society. Efforts in the building of a parallel system eventually were costly for the Albanian 
Kosovar elite to continue to support Kosovo.   
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in Albania gave less support for Kosovo's struggle, and so the route of the Turkish heroin was 
deviated from Kosovo (Stratazzi, 2006: 146). 145  However, one of the crucial findings is the 
relation between the trade-in heroin and the financing of Kosovo's insurgency, since 1997. 
According to Klebnikov et al.:  
As the war in Kosovo heated up, the drug traffickers began supplying the KLA 
with weapons procured from Eastern European and Italian crime groups in 
exchange for heroin. (Klebnikov et al., 2017).  
The illicit trade has contributed in great part on the funding of the KLA and its insurgency, 
which broke into frequent violent incidents and clashes against the Serbians.  
3.5. Interventions from international organizations 
After the Dayton Peace Agreement, the KLA armed resistance grew and began retaliation 
against the Serbian armed forces, which brought increased international and media attention to 
Kosovo’s struggle and the human rights violations practiced by Serbia. The rise of KLA in the 
1996 gave way to a network of militants that operated in various areas of Kosovo. The year 
1997 was a turning point in the political approach to the Kosovo’s struggle as radical Albanian 
Kosovan networks sought after power and challenged Rugova’s leadership. While Rugova 
tried to strengthen his position by negotiating with Milosevic an education agreement for the 
students of the University of Pristina, the attempt did not secure Rugova’s power for much 
longer after the rapid rise of KLA radicals support.146  
Besides, after the power struggle, political unrest and governmental collapse in  the Albanian 
Republic, KLA and other rebels in Kosovo gained easy access to arms trade through Kosovo-
 
145 The new route that took shape under the auspices of the Kosovo warring factions connected Bulgaria with 
Macedonia and Albania (Stratazzi, 2006: 147).  
146 Because of the failed negations on the access by the Albanian Kosovan students to the University in Pristina, 




Albanian borders and so were able to arm the KLA fighters. As a result, provocations 
intensified and because KLA’s activity was related to criminal networks and because they 
followed a violent approach, there was an increased sense of fear and insecurity among 
Albanian Kosovans. While KLA terror activities were mainly directed at Serbian police and 
Serbian civilians, so was the violence directed towards the Albanese civilians that supported 
LDK and the FARK. However, the Albanian-American diaspora community kept directing 
their political and financial support from LDK to KLA. Besides, tens of thousands more people 
joined KLA and as members anybody would be allowed to hold a weapon and call themselves 
a supporter of KLA. Moreover, the result of the provocations by KLA resulted in an escalation 
of violence against innocent civilians, because KLA could not protect and defend Albanian 
civilians against Serb counterattacks.  
In March of 1998, a major violent incident, known as the Drenica Massacre was the first of the 
most violent events that received media attention in Kosovo.147 This incident was the beginning 
of subsequently violent incidents among the Kosovan KLA’s resistance and provocation and 
Serbian armed forces more powerful counterattacks. The KLA rebels killed four Serb police 
officers in clashes because they wanted to protect the Drenica region, as it was the center of 
their parallel economy. However, the Serb counterattack followed on 28 February, hit back and 
killed 26 people in Drenica, more 58 deaths, after the attack on 4 March, by arresting an 
Albanian guerilla leader, Adem Jashari (Sörensen, 2006: 343). The second major incident 
happened on September 26, 1998, known as The Gronje Obrinje Massacre. In this attack by 
the Serb forces, according to Bahador about "36 civilians,  including women, children, and the 
 
147 Separatism was started by KLA through an armed struggle against Serbia during the 1997 and 1998, with 
violent retaliation by Serbs on KLA in the villages of the central Drenica Region. According to the article 
"Kosovo: The Historical and Political Background” the international sanctions against Serbia by the “Contact 
Group” was limited, as the Serbian side continued to provide reinforcement into the Drenica region which caused 
a displacement of about 200,000-300,000 Albanians from the region. ("Kosovo: The Historical and Political 
Background”. In “Kosovo/ Kosova As Seen, As Told: An analysis of the human rights findings of the OSCE 
Kosovo Verification Mission, October 1998 to June 1999” OSCE, 2003 May 12: 26. Available at: 
https://www.osce.org/odihr/17772?download=true (accessed 12/06/2019).  
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elderly were brutally killed" (Bahador, 2007: 83). International system began condemning both 
sides for using violent and terrorist actions and hoped for KLA to eventually reach a ceasefire 
and instead chose to engage in peaceful negotiations, which have never happened and therefore, 
only led to conflict escalation to Kosovo’s War in 1999. At first KLA was thought to be a 
terrorist organization but later these perceptions changed after Richard Holbrooke denying such 
accusations against the KLA, and "in June, Richard Holbrooke, held meetings with KLA 
representatives” (Sorensen, 2006: 343). This was important for KLA as, later a major 
international intervention led to a military operation against Serbian armed forces. 
To better understand how the KLA’s provocations worked against the Serbian armed forces 
we need to analyze the concept given by Babak Bahador in the book The CNN Effect in Action, 
is also relevant to Kosovo's case because the power of media coverage combined with the 
propaganda of media images and videos, was a major method of  influence on the government's 
decisions on promoting foreign military intervention. 148 
For instance, between 22 April 1996 to 28 February 1998, the type of conflict was low-intensity 
warfare, intending to create unrest, and provoke Serbian side to react with brutal force. The 
KLA armed forces employed classic guerilla hit-and-run tactics and avoided direct 
confrontations. The guerillas directed simultaneous attacks at the Serb police and civilians and 
have also assassinated Albanian Kosovans who collaborated with the Serbian operations 
(Thomas., Mikulan, & Pavlović, D., 2013: 47). The Serbian counterattacks in the same year,  
 
148 The CNN effect can be understood as the influence that shapes the assertion in pursuing a foreign policy in 
relation to military intervention by the West such as, the Kosovo case. The CN,  according to Bahador, affects all 
the three components (reason, passion, probability,  and chance) of the Clausewitz trinity of war and are in a 
complex interplay all of which shape warfare. Military intervention was often opposed to US foreign policy. 
However, the "CNN effect" means that it is an effect created to influence the policy change,  which then turned 
military intervention to become favorable to the US foreign policy.  
95 
 
were stronger because Milosevic ordered a reinforcement of the Serb armed forces. According 
to Thomas., Mikulan, & Pavlović:  
By Feb 1998 the 10,000-strong VJ Pristina Corps had tripled to 30,000 
(percentage of total VJ strength), and the 6,500 Serbian Police, PJP and SAJ 
were tripled to about 19,500 with reservists and extra units. (Thomas., 
Mikulan, & Pavlović, 2013: 47). 
With this reinforcement, the Serbian armed forces were able to hold a massive operation in the 
Drenica region, burning several villages, and therefore, displaced a large size of the Albanian 
population. Moreover, Serbian armed forces were able to seize the Drenica area and the area 
beyond the heartland, that is, about 30% of Kosovo’s area (Fish, 2006: 47). The KLA was 
forced to abandon most of the territory, as Serbs managed to retake 90% of Kosovo by August 
1998. The casualties and damage were enormous according to Thomas, Mikulan, & Pavlović:   
hundreds of fighters and civilians were killed, and about 360,000 civilians 
percent of total Kosovan population) were driven from their homes, many 
fleeing to Albania and Macedonia (Thomas, N., Mikulan, K., & Pavlović, D., 
2013: 48). 
After these incidents the Serbian armed forces were threatened by NATO airstrikes.149 
However, there were attempts on settling for a peaceful negotiation. Milosevic chose to comply 
with the agreement150 by withdrawing the Serb forces form Drenica, and according to Thomas 
& Pavlović, for this the Kosovo Verification Mission (installed a NATO aircraft and 2,000 
OSCE personnel) was responsible for ensuring that the Serbian armed forces were abiding by 
the agreement (Thomas & Pavlović 1992-2001, 2013: 48). However, later Serbian forces, the 
 
149 The airstrikes of 24 March 1999 represented a significant event in international relations because it was a major 
humanitarian operation. The operation was intended to end the human violations and crimes against by the Serbs 
on the Albanian Kosovars. According to Adam Roberts, the intervention started on the basis that “some crimes so 
extreme that a state responsible for them, despite the principle of sovereignty, may properly be the subject of 
military intervention.” (Roberts, Adams, 1999: 103). However, the at the time this operation was quite 
controversial, as actors and individuals opposed the Operation Allied Force, on the ground that the operation’s 
effectiveness had shortcomings in the long-term prevention of humanitarian violations, and whether the use of 
force was legitimate to use against a state (Roberts, Adams, 1999: 103). 
150 At the time Milosevic was already criticized by the Serb population for resorting to violent means against 
civilians in Kosovo. A Serb general who disagreed with Milosevic methods was General Perisic, he was the one 
him who signed the agreement with NATO to withdraw from the Drenica region. 
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Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro (VJ) and the MUP units attacked another KLA 
ambush, which caused the death of four Serb policers. In the end, The KLA provocation 
strategy had paid off and the level of international attention that the KLA received brought 
NATO's military intervention in 1999. 
Before the intervention, the Kosovo Albanian struggle was portrayed through television images 
of the massacres which directed attention to the atrocities of the Serbian armed force against 
Albanians Kosovans. So later it was thought that interventions were a deliberate strategy of 
KLA to put pressure on the pursuing of a military international intervention. According to 
Bahador:  
Although the Albanian community of Kosovo experienced much suffering, 
some observers questioned whether the images of carnage were part of a 
deliberate strategy by an insurgency group called the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA) to gain the West’s attention and sympathies for its independence cause. 
(Bahador, 2007: xxi) 
The report of images proved to be incredibly impactful and effective in raising support for the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (Bahador, 2007: 67). KLA was further aided by KVM forces 
to prepare and organize KLA for a NATO intervention.  The violence by KLA reoccurred in a 
confrontation in the village of Rabak where about 45 Albanians have been massacred by 
Serbian troops, who were warned with military intervention by NATO forces. According to 
Sorensen, (2006), the push for the West’s intervention in Kosovo and support for KLA was 
also the result of heavy lobbying of groups in Washington by “organizations as the 
International Crisis Group (ICG), the Balkan Institute …, and the United States Institute for 
Peace (USIP)” (Sorensen, 2006: 344).  
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NATO’s military intervention, 79-day Operation ´Allied Force´ air strike campaign,151 on 24 
March, resulted in the "1999 NATO air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) over the Kosovo issue, in tacit alliance with the KLA" (Bahador, 2007: xxi). NATO 
bombing operation led to the cease-fire and the Serbian side was left with major damages. after 
the NATO’s military intervention on March 24, 1999, together with the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA), this was the second time in history when the Serbian side retreated from Kosovo 
(Gurr, 2015: xi). 152   
3.6. Post-Kosovo War 
Following the period after NATO's intervention, Kosovans were only successful in becoming 
an independent state in 2008. However, the shadow economy continues to be predominant in 
Kosovo.153 Even though the KLA was forced to demilitarize, the underground illicit activity 
still relates to the KLA radical elements154.  Also, in times of solidarity, when the diasporas 
from abroad provided with tax remittances for the  survival of the Albanian Kosovans at home, 
after the war, the fund was discontinued because of continued issues with corruption (“How to 
build a parallel state”, 2018). Besides, the unemployment is high, and wages are low, and the 
economy had few incentives to transition to a formal economy. According to article 





152 According to Le Billon "the Kosovo Liberation Army, when primary resources of its war economy shifted 
from heroin trafficking and diaspora remittances to NATO and UN support (Le Billon, 2000: 9). 
153Kosovo is the third poorest country of Europe according to the source:  
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-poorest-countries-in-europe.html 
154 In addition, because of the peripheral character of the Balkan region and the development o- long existing 
mafia clans, Kosovo Albanians have continued to practice illicit trade and grew into a global drug trafficking 
channel.  KLEBNIKOV, Peter. “Heroin Heroes.” 2017, June 28. Mother Jones. Available at: 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2000/01/heroin-heroes/ (accessed 3/05/2019). 
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among Kosovo's working-age population – around 1,330,000 people– only 35 
percent (approximately 469,000) can be described as economically active, 
while 65 percent (861,000) are economically inactive or unemployed (World 
of Work Magazine No. 32, 1999: 12).  
According to the periodical analysis the rebuilding of Kosovo the labor market was defined as 
‘catastrophic.' The labor workforce in the aftermath of the Kosovo War has mainly continued 
to be within the grey economic sector and vast unemployment in the formal economy. 
Agriculture constituted the most significant employment rate of about 23% of the workers, 
from which are formed mainly by a male contingent, while women were employed in fewer 
numbers. Besides, the preexistent weak administrative and legal institutions, malfunctioning 
social, labor, and judicial systems, in addition to war’s widespread destruction, caused slow 
transitioning to formal economy. These causes are related to according to the World of Work 
Magazine: 
can be traced back to several interacting factors, including discriminatory 
legislation and hiring practices of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during 
the 1990s. The adoption of the FRY’s Labor Act for Extraordinary 
circumstances resulted in the dismissal of 145,000 Kosovo ethnic Albanians 
from civil administration, public services and economic enterprises (World of 
Work Magazine No. 32, 1999: 13).  
Considering this scenario, the International Labor Organization developed strategies to the 
reconstruction of the labor market in Kosovo, through the labor-intensive reconstruction 
projects, assisting in economic processes which generate employment, and reestablish the 
systems of unemployment and pensions. 155 
Moreover, during the period of 2004-2006, Kosovo still had little progress. The active 
workforce in the informal economy constituted about 50%, with most people being young 
 
155 “Kosovo's Labour Market in a 'Collapsed' State ILO Calls for Labour Intensive Reconstruction Effort.” 
Kosovo's Labour Market in a "Collapsed." State ILO Calls for Labour Intensive Reconstruction Effort, 1999, Oct. 




adults under the age of 24 years old. That is unemployment continued high, about 48% rate, 
while the market had a particularly difficult capability of absorbing the increases per year of 
the young adult population, which means that considering another important economic factor 
are few offers and more demands in the employment market in Kosovo, and therefore there is 
few choice and competition among employers, as wages continue low and young people, are 
either inclined to engage in shadow economy apart from the day job or to leave the country.  
The low wages and failure in implementing policies which can absorb people into the market 
lead to high unemployment. Besides the informal economy often means poor working 
conditions and poor benefits. For instance, about 73% of the young adult workers were not 
covered by social security benefits (Krasniqi &Topxhiu, 2012:14). The main activities of the 
informal economy include work in construction, foresters, trade, services, transport, and 
agriculture sectors. Moreover, there is a strong correlation between the decline in education 
and the decline in the employment of young adults in formal economy jobs. That is, the 
recommendations given in the article by Krasniqi &Topxhiu, are focused on the development 
of new businesses and promotion of self-employment, which in this way could be made more 
accessible to potential employers if the government and policymakers decide to lower costs for 
enterprises and remove obstacles from the enterprises in the informal economy, and instead 
allow them to progressively become part of the formal economy (Krasniqi &Topxhiu, 
2012:19).  
In conclusion, shadow economy is hard to combat and continues to be a challenge for solving 
domestic conflicts where economic factors, have particularly been associated to a long history 
of shadow economic development. Informal economy aspect is prevalent when the state 
disintegrates and loses power to a range of alternative ways for economic survival in a society.  
However, this gives way for criminal groups to benefit from the degraded conditions there is 
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further incentive in the perpetuation of the shadow economy, as a consequence of past 
economic dynamics, relations and conflicts which brought incentives to the development of 







While organized crime is not a new phenomenon today, 
some governments find their authority besieged at home and 
their foreign policy interests imperiled abroad. Drug 
trafficking, links between drug traffickers and terrorists, 
smuggling of illegal aliens, massive financial and bank 
fraud, arms smuggling, potential involvement in the theft 
and sale of nuclear material, political intimidation, and 
corruption all constitute a poisonous brew—a mixture 
potentially as deadly as what we faced during the cold war. 
― R. James Woolsey156 
The analysis of the “new wars” theory and the war economy approach shows that contemporary 
wars have changed and has intensified in many parts of the world. Globalization is not a new 
phenomenon, yet the latest developments in technologies and communications have opened 
doors to opportunities that had strong effects on society, such as, having developed global 
awareness on global issues. This tends to draw people closer together to finding solutions for 
the common worldwide issues. On the other hand, the new forms of mobility and 
communication also expanded opportunities for crime and terrorism and influence the way 
wars were fought and perpetuated. The phenomenon of globalization is particularly associated 
to the emergent new non-state actors, who have greatly benefited from blurred borders and 
eroding state power. These emergent new actors form the criminal links and emerge as a new 
criminal class. Criminal actors are known to be flexible in the creation and maintenance of 
economic channels, associated to illicit activities. For this reason, channels constitute a reliable 
source for the warring groups for the development of war economies in weak states.  
The main question of the thesis was whether the economic factor is the most relevant factor to 
understand the persistence and ongoing nature of the “new wars”, namely in the case of 
Kosovo’s armed conflict. After analyzing the new and changing patterns of conflicts, and the 
 
156 In this quote, the issue of organized crime is the prime concern for strong states, who are challenged by the 
security threats born out of economies of war associated to the trade of drugs, terrorism, and organized crime.  
Quote retrieved from HESTERMAN, Jennifer, L. & USAF, Colonel. Transnational Crime and the Criminal-
Terrorist Nexus: Synergies and Corporate Trends. Alabama: Air University Press, Walker Paper no. 1, May 2005.  
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growth of the shadow economy, we can conclude that the economic factor has a significant 
impact in the continuation of violence and conflict within those countries with a large shadow 
economy. The spreading of conflicts can be noticed because the neighboring countries usually 
share the same economic issues and in general, when economic development is low, there is 
dissatisfaction among workers in society, there are more ethnic disputes, social unrest and 
political chaos. These circumstances are usually a sign of war economies which are developed 
in order to fight for a political cause. War economies are developed in the long-term and for 
this reason, their aspects end up weighting on societies because war economies bring 
destruction and are a cause for the proliferation of non-ending violence. At the same time, the 
aspects of the ethnic conflicts, also play an important role because war economies tend to 
exacerbate the divide among an ethnically diverse population. Therefore, in the contemporary 
conflicts, the economic aspect has been a growing issue because the general development of 
mafia-style economies tends to create a pax mafiosa, and therefore, brings the cooperation 
between mafia bosses, from diverse ethnicities into a mutual economic benefit, through the 
creation and maintenance of transnational criminal networks. At the same time, the emergent 
new warring groups tend to relate to the criminal networks, whose illegal arms trade can bring 
a general violent oriented approach rather than to rely on the legal ways to settling a conflict.  
In the long term, the war economies tend to be destructive for the state institutions and 
economic development. War economies tend to open doors to criminalized economy which is 
designated as illegal sector of the economy. These economies exist outside of the state’s formal 
economy, in cases when the state cannot provide the basic goods and services to the people. A 
parallel society develops out of the scarcity of the necessities, and to survive a large part of the 
society tends to engage in criminal activity. In a state of chaos, the warring groups tend to take 
advantage of the people and use the state’s territory as bases for the development of criminal 
networks. In this sense, globalization is a driving force for the development of alternative 
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economic systems, in which money is raised through internal and external funding through 
illegal means. The conflict spreads across borders and warring forces threaten the peace near 
the borderland regions with other states. Therefore, if the war economies are not addressed 
appropriately, they spread and create a greater level of insecurity.  
The dissertation discusses the topic of “new wars”, which is relevant to the analysis of war 
economies because the thesis points to these new changing patterns and alerts for the need of 
a new approach to intrastate conflicts. Furthermore, the topic of shadow economy addressed 
the aspects which affect the development of the economy, and in this case shadow economy is 
also a sign of weak state, corruption, ineffective policies and perpetuation of violence.  It has 
often been pointed out in case studies that conflicts are mainly a consequence of identity 
politics. However, conflict for causes such as pure greed are often overlooked and international 
interventions have often failed to comprehend the intrastate conflicts, and so failed to address 
the conflicts from an economic approach. This made it difficult to prevent conflicts from 
spreading among the most vulnerable states, as we conclude suggesting that a new approach 
regarding war economy should be dared.  
As we have seen in Chapter I, the “new wars” thesis can be understood as  the result of  an 
emergence of new patterns, which is apparent in the increase of intrastate wars. According to 
Mary Kaldor, in these types of wars, the state is no longer seen as the sole legitimate bearer of 
arms, because in poorer regions globalization accelerated state erosion, both from above and 
from below. The state loses control over the territory as its monopoly of violence, one of the 
state’s main and most important basic functions, gets eroded. In the place of the state, a 
multitude of actors emerge and create complex interconnections among them, and so the 
conflict and violence tend to last with no end in sight.  
104 
 
In the “new wars”, warlords conduct ethnic cleansing across inhabited areas by different 
ethnicity groups in order to homogenize the population within the territory, and  so mass 
migration and displacement of people is evident in these conflict zones. The main targets are 
innocent civilians, with the most vulnerable being women, children, and the elderly. Another 
feature of “new wars” is that these wars are asymmetrical wars, which means that in the 
contemporary wars, the warring groups can be even effective than the powerful states, who are 
technologically and military superior. A characteristic of “new wars” is that forces are 
dispersed in space and time based on the guerilla principles, and therefore conflicts can flare 
up anywhere. 
This assumption is connected in Chapter II, on the discussion on the war economies. The war 
economies prevalent in intrastate conflicts and are important to understand because they 
address the motivations of war and the distribution of resources in times of war. Flexibility and 
resilience are the two main characteristics of contemporary war economies, because they can 
continue to work even after the end of a violent conflict. The war economy can be understood 
as an intent to mobilize resources for military resources originating from people's contributions 
to the state. However, leaders allocate the state revenue for war purposes, which benefit the 
economic interests of a small elite.  In turn, less public goods and services are provided to 
civilians and create poverty. War economy does not create economic benefits for the rest of the 
population. Instead, according to the article The Political Economy of War: what relief 
Agencies Need to Know, 2000 by Philippe Le Billon, war economies damage the 
macroeconomy which explains the bad distribution of goods through the population, the 
collapse of economic regulation, low trust, reduced investment, opportunistic behavior, falling 
incomes, emergence in parallel economies and illicit trade, hyperinflation. The war economy 
also has microeconomic consequences which affect the individuals, such as, their rights, access 
to essential goods and services.  
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According to the article War Economies in a Regional Context, 2004 by Kaysie Studdard, the 
primary resources for raising revenue for the warring groups are the natural resources and are 
considered an essential factor in the continuation of the war economy, especially on a regional 
level where neighbors become involved in the trade through complicated routes. Other the 
other most profitable sources of revenue are human trafficking, organized crime and diasporic 
funding. These sources play a significant role in many war economies as well help fund 
insurgencies and insurgent groups. Besides, factors such as state corruption, tax evasion, and 
manipulation of foreign aid also contribute to the continuation of war economies. The increased 
elite corruption of these failed states has broken apart from the development of a consolidated 
economy. The state revenue often decreases and there is little domestic production. For the 
elites, to sustain the costs of war and interests, finance came mainly from illicit activities and 
involved financial manipulations, predatory practices conducted by state entities, to ensure the 
control over the productive resources. The population is forced to engage in the illicit activities 
of shadow economies. 
It is especially challenging to end these types of conflicts whose primary motivation is based 
on greed. The appropriation of resources gives power to an elite and creates degradant 
conditions for the rest of the population. The international interventions have imposed policies 
and sanctions; however, these can constitute an incentive for engaging in shadow economies. 
When warring actors networks are consolidated enough on a regional level and they can easily 
create and readapt and redirect the trade in illicit goods and services through different channels. 
Also, it is difficult to trace the leaders of these networks because activity records on them are 
ambiguous. 
In Chapter III we focus on the case study on Kosovo’s war economy. Kosovo’s war economy 
can be characterized as a predominantly commercial war economy that has shifted from the 
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acquisition of funds from illegal trade in the shadow economy and diaspora contributions to 
the military support provided by NATO. The conflict has elements of ethnic cleansing, 
economic crisis, political, institutional weakness, a power struggle over the territory, 
complexity of actors with varied interests and high numbers of displaced people, victims, and 
violent incidents. The political and economic violence are present and are further exacerbated 
when the state is fragile, which creates more vulnerability towards the opening of opportunities 
for criminal activity. Therefore, the shadow economy is also a crucial element in the analysis 
of conflicts because from these, especially illegal activities the situation in some Eastern 
European countries is still plagued by corruption, low economic development with the presence 
of a large shadow economy.  
To sum up the analysis on war economies, the case study provided a good insight into the types 
of new war conflicts, because it addresses the problem of the “new wars” aspects in the late 
twentieth century. While the Kosovo case study showed a clear relation to the changing patterns 
of the “new wars” and the existence of a well-consolidated shadow economy. Therefore, the 
motivations of the war in Kosovo can be understood as a mix of ethnic motivations, higher 
ambitions, and development of a large shadow economy and engagement in illicit activities. 
Therefore, more attention and resources should be drawn to the prevention and elimination of 
illicit economy in order to achieve a more sustainable peacebuilding and life improvements for 
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